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Philippines: Designing a Local Government Enhancement Fund
The main transfer instrument from the central government to local government units (LGUs) in 
the Philippines, the internal revenue allotment, has been criticized for: its inability to equalize 
sufficiently, especially regarding the poorer municipalities and provinces, and its funds not having 
been spent efficiently. For some time, LGUs have petitioned the Government of the Philippines 
to expand the funding of the IRA. However, there appears to be ample consensus that any 
additional funding needs to be distributed in a manner that addresses the design flaws of the IRA. 
In this paper, options for the design of a possible new transfer, the Fiscal Equity and Expenditure 
Performance Fund, separate from the IRA, are outlined. Such design faces four major challenges: 
(i) how to define the origin and computation of the additional funding, (ii) how to divide the 
additional funding among the different groups of LGUs (provinces, cities, municipalities, and 
barangays), (iii) what formula to use for the distribution of the additional funds for qualifying LGUs 
in each particular group of LGUs, and (iv) how to ensure that LGUs will use the additional funds to 
improve their service delivery performance. The transfer mechanism suggested as a result offers a 
bridge toward the eventual review and reform of the IRA.
About the Asian Development Bank
ADB’s vision is an Asia and Pacific region free of poverty. Its mission is to help its developing 
member countries reduce poverty and improve the quality of life of their people. Despite the 
region’s many successes, it remains home to two-thirds of the world’s poor: 1.8 billion people who 
live on less than $2 a day, with 903 million struggling on less than $1.25 a day. ADB is committed 
to reducing poverty through inclusive economic growth, environmentally sustainable growth, and 
regional integration.
Based in Manila, ADB is owned by 67 members, including 48 from the region. Its main 
instruments for helping its developing member countries are policy dialogue, loans, equity 
investments, guarantees, grants, and technical assistance.
Asian Development Bank
6 ADB Avenue, Mandaluyong City
1550 Metro Manila, Philippines
www.adb.org/poverty
Publication Stock No. WPS114035
October 2011
Printed on recycled paper. Printed in the Philippines
Southeast Asia 
Working Paper Series
ADB Southeast Asia Working Paper Series 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Philippines: Designing a Local Government 
Enhancement Fund 
 
 
 
Jorge Martínez-Vázquez and Yongzheng Liu 
No. 7       October 2011 
 
 
Jorge Martínez-Vázquez, Regents Professor of 
Economics and Director of the International 
Studies Program, Andrew Young School of Policy 
Studies, Georgia State University 
 
Yongzheng Liu, Research Associate, International 
Studies Program, Andrew Young School of Policy 
Studies, Georgia State University  
 
 Asian Development Bank  
6 ADB Avenue, Mandaluyong City 
1550 Metro Manila, Philippines 
www.adb.org 
 
© 2011 by Asian Development Bank  
October 2011 
Publication Stock No. WPS114035 
 
 
 
The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of the 
Asian Development Bank (ADB) or its Board of Governors or the governments they represent. 
 
ADB does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this publication and accepts no responsibility for any 
consequence of their use. 
 
By making any designation of or reference to a particular territory or geographic area, or by using the term "country" 
in this document, ADB does not intend to make any judgments as to the legal or other status of any territory or area. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The ADB Southeast Asia Working Paper Series is a forum for stimulating discussion and eliciting feedback on 
ongoing and recently completed economic, sector, and policy work undertaken by ADB staff members, consultants, 
or resource persons in the context of operational work of the Southeast Asia Department (SERD). The series deals 
with economic and development issues in Southeast Asia, and aims to enhance knowledge of Southeast Asia’s 
development and policy challenges, strengthen subregional and country operations, and contribute to policy dialogue 
at the national and regional levels.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       Printed on recycled paper.
CONTENTS 
 
CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS iv 
ABBREVIATIONS iv 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS v 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY vi 
I. INTRODUCTION 1 
II. DEFINING THE ORIGIN AND COMPUTATION OF THE 10% ADDITIONAL FUNDING 3 
III. APPORTIONING THE ADDITIONAL FUNDING AMONG THE DIFFERENT GROUPS 
OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS 8 
IV. ALTERNATIVE FORMULA FOR THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE ADDITIONAL FUNDS 
TO QUALIFYING LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS 10 
A. Expanding the Weighted Index Formula in the Internal Revenue Allotment 11 
B. Distributing the Fiscal Equity and Expenditure Performance Fund on the Basis  
of Estimated Fiscal Gaps of Local Government Units 13 
C. Approaches to Estimating Expenditure Needs 15 
D. Approaches to Estimating Fiscal Capacity 20 
E. Coming Up with the Fiscal Gap for Local Government Units 23 
V. PERFORMANCE-BASED EVALUATION OF RECIPIENT  
LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS 31 
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 33 
APPENDIXES 
1. Basic Rationale and Measurement of Weights for Expenditure Needs Factors 35 
2. Alternative Approaches to Measuring Expenditure Needs 36 
3. Alternative Approaches to Measuring Fiscal Capacity 42 
4. Computation of Per Capita Fiscal Equity and Expenditure Performance Fund  
Transfers by Adjusted Weighted Index Formula in the Internal Revenue Allotment  
for Provinces 46 
5. Computation of Per Capita Expenditure Needs by Expenditure Norms (EN1)  
for Provinces 47 
6. Computation of per Capita Expenditure Needs by Weighted Index Formula (EN2)  
for Provinces 48 
7. Computation of Per Capita Fiscal Capacity according to the Average of Past Collection 
Ratios (FC1) for Provinces 49 
8. Computation of Relative Fiscal Gaps for Provinces 50 
REFERENCES 51 
CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS 
(as of 26 September 2011) 
 
Currency Unit – peso (P) 
$1.00 = P43.7100 
P1.00 = $0.0228 
 
 
 
 
 
ABBREVIATIONS 
 
FEEP – Fiscal Equity and Expenditure Performance Fund 
IRA  – internal revenue allotment 
LGU – local government unit 
VAT – value-added tax 
 
 
NOTE 
In this paper, “$” refers to US dollars. 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
 
The authors wish to thank Juan Luis Gomez for his leadership in this important initiative, as well 
as Raymund Fabre and Norman Ramos for their general support and guidance. They would like 
to express appreciation for the insights and guidance of Rolando Acosta, director; Anna Liza 
Bonagua, assistant director; Manuel Gotis, director; and Austere Panadero, undersecretary of 
the Department of the Interior and Local Government; Myrna Chua, director; Carmencita 
Delantar, director; and Laura Pascua, undersecretary of the Department of Budget and 
Management; Pamela Quizon and Arnold Tan of the Bureau of Local Government Finance; 
Monina Camacho of the Union of Local Authorities of the Philippines; Veronica Hitosis of the 
League of Cities of the Philippines; Alex Villano of the League of Provinces of the Philippines; 
Alex Brillantes and Jose Tiu Sonco of the University of the Philippines; Rosario Manasan of the 
Philippines Institute of Development Studies; and Gaudioso Sosmeña of the Local Government 
Development Foundation. Lastly, the authors are indebted to Violeta Vulovic for her 
computational assistance. 
 
This paper also benefited from a workshop conducted on 27 April 2011 at the 
Richmonde Hotel in Pasig City, Philippines, where invaluable inputs were received from 
representatives of the Congressional Policy and Budget Research Office of the House of 
Representatives, Department of Agrarian Reform, Department of Education, Department of 
Social Welfare and Development, and National Economic and Development Authority. 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
The main transfer instrument from the central government to local government units (LGUs) in 
the Philippines, the internal revenue allotment (IRA), has been criticized for (i) its inability to 
equalize sufficiently, especially regarding the poorer municipalities and provinces; and (ii) its 
funds failing to be spent in an efficient manner. Recently, LGU associations have petitioned the 
Government of the Philippines for an expansion of the funding of the IRA from 40% of internal 
revenue collection to 50%, and several draft bills toward this goal have been prepared.  
 
Most agree that if the additional 10% of funding were to occur, these funds should not be 
distributed following the same methodology used for the IRA. The distribution of the additional 
funds needs to have a much stronger equalization effect among LGUs, and the recipient LGUs 
should be held accountable to use the funds to improve the performance of public services.  
 
The new transfer so far has been called the Local Government Enhancement Fund, but 
this paper proposes a more descriptive name, the Fiscal Equity and Expenditure Performance 
Fund (FEEP). 
 
The design of the new transfer with 10% additional funding, separate from the IRA, will 
face four major challenges: (i) defining the origin and computation of the 10% additional funding, 
(ii) apportioning the additional funding among the different groups of LGUs (i.e., provinces, 
cities, municipalities, and barangays [neighborhoods]), (iii) defining a formula to use for the 
distribution of the additional funds for qualifying LGUs in each particular group of LGUs, and  
(iv) ensuring that the additional funds will be used by LGUs to improve their service delivery 
performance.  
 
For the first challenge, two main options are explored in this paper: (i) using the same 
base as the IRA, which is internal revenue collection; or (ii) using the broader base of total 
national revenues, which expands the IRA base to include all collections by the Bureau of 
Customs and Bureau of Internal Revenue. The potentially important difference between these 
two approaches is how the two bases will perform in the future, in particular from the viewpoint 
of their volatility. Although there is some evidence that the broader base (i.e., total revenues) 
exhibits more volatility over time, the differences are not significant. Therefore, there is not a 
clear preference for either of the two bases for the FEEP.  
 
Several other less orthodox options for obtaining the additional funding are also 
explored. First, funding of the IRA could be frozen as of 2011, holding all LGUs in future years 
to the same funding in absolute numbers that they had in 2011, and utilizing the increases in 
nominal pesos from the 40% formula for the IRA to finance and expand the FEEP. This means 
that the importance of the FEEP vis-à-vis the IRA would increase over the years, and it is an 
indirect way to reform the IRA. Second, some of the resources currently distributed through the 
government conditional transfers to the FEEP could be shifted, in particular special funds to the 
budgets of sector agencies (e.g., agriculture) that may not be used or that are inefficiently 
utilized. Third, the introduction of negative transfers from wealthier LGUs to the FEEP could be 
considered.  
 
For the second challenge, apportioning the additional funding among the different 
groups of LGUs, an option is to modify the current apportionment percentages used in the IRA 
by excluding barangays from the vertical distribution and distributing their share proportionally to 
the other LGU groups. Currently, the IRA is subject to a vertical distribution formula that 
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provides 23% of the funds to provinces, 23% to cities, 34% to municipalities, and 20% to 
barangays. This proposal, however, produces shares of 28.75% each for provinces and cities, 
and 42.50% for municipalities. A second option focuses on the vertical distribution among 
provinces, cities, and municipalities being proportional to their respective aggregate positive 
fiscal gaps. The apportionment percentages under this approach becomes about 15% for 
provinces, 18% for cities, and 67% for municipalities. The advantage of both approaches is that 
they offer a rationale for the vertical distribution as opposed to a new rule that is arbitrarily 
derived.  
 
Fundamentally, this second approach is the only sound approach to the derivation of the 
vertical distribution rule. However, in the future, true expenditure needs of the different LGU 
groups have to be derived; this paper uses a historical approximation of expenditure needs, and 
there is no reason to expect the two measures of expenditure needs to coincide. Different 
methodologies were used to compute the expenditure needs of LGUs. 
 
The section focusing on the third challenge, defining a formula to use for the distribution 
of the additional funds for qualifying LGUs in each group of LGUs, develops several approaches 
for distribution of the new available funds. Under the new distribution rules, not all LGUs would 
get funds. Second, the distribution of funds is based on the quantification of the fiscal gap 
concept, which is the difference between expenditure needs of an LGU and its fiscal capacity to 
raise revenues.  
 
Before discussing and computing the concepts of fiscal gap, expenditure needs, and 
fiscal capacity, the paper presents a formula to distribute the funds in each LGU group that is 
similar but significantly improves upon the current formula used for the IRA (i.e., a weighted 
index of population, land area, and equal shares). The improved, weighted index introduces 
additional factors to population and land area (e.g., youth and elderly populations and the 
incidence of poverty) to proxy the differences in expenditure needs. It also introduces an 
additional factor in the weighted index to account for the differences in fiscal capacity across 
LGUs. Note that the new improved index eliminates the equal share factor currently used in the 
IRA. However, under this expanded weighted index approach, all LGUs still receive some FEEP 
funds. That is not the case with the fiscal gap approach that follows. 
 
The core approach to the distribution of funds within each group of LGUs consists of the 
estimation of a fiscal gap, defined as the difference between expenditure needs and fiscal 
capacity, for each LGU. The paper reviews the different methodologies available for the 
estimation of expenditure needs and fiscal capacity, and it implements, with 2008 data, two 
measures for the estimation of expenditure needs and two measures for the estimation of fiscal 
capacity.  
 
The simulations of the FEEP transfers are carried out with the different methodologies 
assuming two different vertical allocation rules across LGU groups. The first is a modified IRA 
allocation rule, excluding barangays, and the results are reproduced in the first table below. The 
second is in proportion to the aggregate positive fiscal gaps in each group of LGUs, and the 
results are reproduced in the second table below. Note that using the fiscal gap approach allows 
restriction of FEEP transfers only to those LGUs that have a positive fiscal gap (i.e., where 
expenditure needs exceed fiscal capacity). 
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Per Capita Fiscal Equity and Expenditure Performance Fund Transfers under 
Proportional Allocation and Adjusted Internal Revenue Allotment Vertical  
Distribution Rule, 2008 
(P) 
 
Provinces Cities Municipalities 
Minimum 0 0 0 
Maximum 2,031.23 4,445.48 9,068.76 
Average 126.42 576.52 315.71 
Standard deviation 326.42 1,016.61 669.30 
Coefficient of variation 2.58 1.76 2.12 
Total FEEP transfers 
(P million) 
15,376.74 15,376.74 22,730.83 
FEEP = Fiscal Equity and Expenditure Performance Fund. 
 
 
Per Capita Fiscal Equity and Expenditure Performance Fund Transfers under 
Proportional Allocation and Share of Aggregate Fiscal Gap Vertical  
Distribution Rule, 2008 
(P) 
 
Provinces Cities Municipalities 
Minimum 0 0 0 
Maximum 127.17 3,213.12 16,520.08 
Average 7.92 416.70 575.12 
Standard deviation 20.44 734.79 1,219.23 
Coefficient of variation 2.58 1.76 2.12 
Total FEEP transfers 
(P million) 
9,627.18 11,114.03 41,407.54 
FEEP = Fiscal Equity and Expenditure Performance Fund. 
 
 
The last section of the paper addresses the fourth challenge, ensuring that the additional 
FEEP funds will be used by LGUs to improve their service delivery performance. As opposed to 
using ex-ante conditionality for receiving these additional funds, the paper proposes to use  
ex-post performance indicators, which preserves a higher degree of autonomy of LGUs. The 
carefully selected performance indicators need to be measured independently from the LGUs 
themselves and should be meaningful regarding the quality of life of LGU residents. The 
indicators should preferably be service outputs, as opposed to outcomes, given that the local 
jurisdictions tend to have much less control for service outcomes. Because of very different 
starting points in most indicators for various LGUs, performance needs to be read as 
differentiated changes in the selected indicators.  
 
Failure to deliver improved performance in the set period would be followed by 
suspension of one-half of the available funding. After another round or period of performance, 
the funding could be completely suspended with continued failure to improve, or fully restored 
with increased performance. Although the paper explores past experience in the Philippines 
with performance indicators and the several possibilities available, the actual selection of the 
performance indicators requires further study. 
 I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The main transfer instrument from the central government to local government units1 (LGUs) in 
the Philippines is the internal revenue allotment (IRA), introduced in 2001. The IRA has been 
criticized for two main failings.2 The first is its inability to equalize sufficiently, especially 
regarding poorer municipalities and provinces. The second is the feeling that the IRA funds, to a 
large extent unconditional in their use by LGUs, have not been spent in an efficient manner to 
improve the daily life of citizens.  
 
Recently, LGU associations have petitioned the Government of the Philippines for an 
expansion of the funding of the IRA from 40% of internal revenue collections to 50%. Although 
there is not full agreement on this expansion, the possibility of more funding is being seriously 
considered by the executive and legislative branches. Within the government, most agree that if 
the additional 10% in funding were to occur, these funds should not be distributed following the 
same methodology used for the IRA.3 
 
Two general requirements for implementing the additional 10% funding are often 
mentioned.4 The first is that the additional funds must have a much stronger equalization effect 
among LGUs.5 The second is that accountability should increase for how the recipient LGUs 
use the funds to improve the performance of public services. These two general objectives are 
also desired goals for IRA reform.  
 
The design of the new transfer, named by this paper as the Fiscal Equity and 
Expenditure Performance Fund (FEEP),6 comprises the 10% additional funding and is separate 
from the IRA. Although reform of the IRA is not politically viable at this time, the FEEP can 
become a model for its eventual reform if the IRA overall allocation is frozen in a hold-harmless 
position for all LGU recipients in a base year, for example 2011, and annual nominal increments 
in the IRA funding are moved to the FEEP.7 
 
                                               
1
 These include provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays, the equivalent of neighborhoods. The relationships 
between different LGUs, and especially those of cities and municipalities with the barangays, are examined in 
several essays in Preschle and Sosmeña (2007).  
2
 See Government of the Philippines, DILG (2009) for a recent assessment of the decentralization system in the 
Philippines.  
3
 See Pardo (2005), Brillantes (2005), and Guevara (2006, 2007) for discussions of the problems associated with the 
current design of the IRA and proposals for reform. 
4
 The draft bill on the LGU Enhancement Fund (not an official name) provides that the additional 10% should be 
allocated according to the two criteria of equity and performance. Some of the available drafts of the bill include a 
concrete split of the 10% funds into 5% for equity adjustments and 5% for performance.  
5
 Several proposals have been made for reforming the IRA; the most recent is by JICA (2008). Also, see Manasan 
and Chaterjee (2003) and World Bank (2010) for the existing and growing inequality and lack of economic 
convergence across geographical regions in the Philippines. A more recent assessment of the impact of 
decentralization in the Philippines can be found in Brillantes et al. (2010).  
6
 The proposals for this initiative have used the term Local Government Enhancement Fund. This report proposes 
the new, more descriptive name of FEEP. 
7
 One issue to take into account may be the proliferation of special funds in the intergovernment finance system of 
the Philippines. However, the FEEP will have very different features and objectives than other existing funds. The 
Special Education Fund was introduced in the Local Government Code of 2001 and earmarks the proceeds from 
an additional 1% tax on real property to support school boards. See Manasan and Castel (2010) for a discussion of 
issues related to this fund. The Performance Challenge Fund that is being created for LGUs will have considerably 
smaller funding than the FEEP (i.e., P500 million). It will be dedicated to matching high-impact capital infrastructure 
projects, and it will follow a completely different approach to LGU performance. The Performance Challenge Fund 
will confer a “seal of good housekeeping” to prequalifying LGUs focusing on the areas of administrative good 
governance.    
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This paper explores the four major challenges facing the design of the FEEP: 
(i) Defining the origin and computation of the 10% additional funding. The 
base of the funding could be internal revenue collections, as in the case of the 
IRA, or something different. LGU associations have requested use of total 
government revenues for the IRA. Thus, the advantages and disadvantages of 
the different choices, and other alternatives, are explored. 
(ii) Apportioning the additional funding among the different groups of local 
government units (i.e., provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays). 
One possibility is to use the current apportionment percentages in the IRA. 
However, there is widespread perception that the initial arbitrariness of the IRA 
apportionment percentages is part of the problem, causing the significant and 
increasing fiscal disparities among groups of LGUs. Other options are thus 
explored. 
(iii) Distributing the additional funds for qualifying local government units in 
each group. Most agree on the need to improve the current formula used for the 
IRA distributions based on a weighted index of population, land area, and equal 
shares. Further, more accurate measurement of the expenditure needs of LGUs 
is required than that provided by the population, area, and equal shares in the 
IRA formula. Some measure of fiscal revenue capacity is also needed. This 
paper explores new formulas and methodologies given current data availability. 
(iv) Ensuring that the additional funds are used by local government units to 
improve their service delivery performance. As opposed to using ex-ante 
conditionality for the additional funds (e.g., where the money can be spent or 
what kind of inputs to use), the goal is to preserve a high degree of autonomy of 
LGUs but demand from them ex-post proof of improved performance in a number 
of carefully selected indicators. These indicators need to be measured 
independently from the LGUs themselves and must be meaningful regarding the 
quality of life of residents. Because of very different starting points in most 
indicators for various LGUs, the improvements need to be read as differentiated 
changes in those indicators. Failure to deliver improved performance in the set 
period could be followed by suspension of one-half of the available funding. After 
another round or period of performance, the funding could be completely 
suspended with continued failure to improve, or fully restored with increased 
performance. 
 
 II.  DEFINING THE ORIGIN AND COMPUTATION  
OF THE 10% ADDITIONAL FUNDING 
 
Even though it is uncertain that the additional funding approved for the FEEP will be an extra 
10%,8 it is necessary to make this assumption to go forward with this paper.  
 
The next question concerns the source of the 10% additional funding. From a political 
and economic perspective, it is important to disassociate the FEEP and its funding from the IRA 
to mute legalist interpretations that since the increment in funding is based on the IRA, so 
should the distribution formula. That is, it is imperative to make clear that the FEEP is not part of 
the IRA, since it pursues very different objectives with different means.  
 
There are several alternatives that can be explored to determine the funding rule for the 
FEEP: 
(i) Using the same base as for the internal revenue allotment. A simple answer 
is to use the current arrangement under the IRA, increasing the allotment from 
the current 40% of the IRA to 50%. This funding is based on collections from the 
National Internal Revenue Code, comprising internal revenue taxes or taxes 
collected by the Bureau of Internal Revenue, such as all income taxes, transfer 
taxes, excise taxes on domestic trade, value-added taxes (VATs) on domestic 
trade, other business taxes, documentary stamp taxes, and other miscellaneous 
taxes. This approach can use the machinations already in place for the 
distribution of the IRA. It also preserves certain revenue sources, such as 
customs revenues and fuel taxes, for the central government. However, this 
approach also links the FEEP too directly and explicitly with the existing IRA, 
creating future problems when the formula for the distribution of funds will differ 
between the two. In addition, it may not be the most responsive to the requests 
for additional funding from the LGU associations, which have also been 
requesting broadening the IRA base to all national tax revenues, including 
customs revenues and fuel taxes. 
(ii) Using an expanded base from central government total revenues. This 
alternative uses a broader base, specifically all central government revenues, 
including customs taxes and fuel taxes, to compute the 10% additional funding 
for the FEEP. In absolute terms for the base year, this means the same revenues 
as in (i). Thus, rather than adding 10 percentage points to the IRA computation, 
the same amount of funds is derived by multiplying national tax revenues by x%. 
However, over time, the absolute amount in pesos could become different if that 
initial x% is kept and the national tax revenues and internal revenues evolve 
differently. This approach has the advantage of partially fulfilling one standing 
request of the LGU associations to use total central government revenues for the 
IRA, but it entails a potentially larger commitment of funds by the central 
government over time.  
(iii) Other less conventional approaches. One possibility is to freeze the funding of 
the IRA as of 2011, for example, holding all LGUs in future years to the same 
funding in absolute numbers that they had in 2011. Then, the increases in 
nominal pesos from the 40% formula for the IRA could be used to finance and 
expand the FEEP. This would mean that the importance of the FEEP regarding 
the IRA would increase over the years, and the FEEP would become a good 
                                               
8
 In the authors’ preliminary meetings, other figures were mentioned, including, for example, additional funding of 
only 5%.  
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model for IRA reform. A second approach is to shift some of the resources 
currently distributed through government conditional transfers to the FEEP. In 
particular, there appears to be special funds in the budgets of sector agencies 
(e.g., agriculture) that are either unused or inefficiently utilized. A third possibility 
is to consider the introduction of negative transfers from wealthier LGUs to the 
FEEP. Several countries finance their equalization grants fully or partially with 
such fraternal systems (also known as Robin Hood systems) of finance. Here, 
LGUs that have a negative fiscal gap, defined as the difference between 
expenditure needs and fiscal capacity, are required to contribute to a centrally 
managed equalization fund. This approach has the potential of significantly 
lowering the fiscal costs to the central government of introducing the FEEP. 
However, it implies that IRA reform may be politically unviable. The introduction 
of a fraternal system of finance, being new to the Philippines, may face strong 
opposition by LGUs.  
 
The two more feasible strategies for funding the FEEP are (i) and (ii). Although  
(ii) includes a wider revenue base, since it includes customs revenues and fuel taxes, it is 
unclear that it would be superior to the internal revenue base in (i) from all perspectives, such as 
stability and predictability.  
 
 
Figure 1: Evolution of Selected Tax Instruments as Share  
of Gross Domestic Product in Asia, 1975–2005 
 
Sources: International Monetary Fund (http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/gfs/manual/gfs.htm), World Bank 
(http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators) 
 
 
In terms of revenue trends, customs taxes represent a declining revenue source 
because future trade and tariff reforms are likely to lower the level and to narrow the dispersion 
of tariff rates. This trend is illustrated in Figure 1 for a group of Asian countries, where it can be 
seen that the share of customs taxes (the largest component by far of taxes on international 
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trade) has decreased vis-à-vis the shares of income taxes and taxes on goods and services.9 
The declining relative importance over time of taxes on international trade is not an exclusive 
phenomenon for Asia but can be observed in most regions of the world, as shown in Figure 2.  
 
 
Figure 2: Taxes on International Trade as a Share  
of Gross Domestic Product by Region, 1972–2005 
 
EU = European Union. 
Note: EU15+ includes the 15 EU countries, Iceland, Norway, and Switzerland. 
Sources: International Monetary Fund (http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/gfs/manual/gfs.htm), World Bank 
(http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators) 
 
 
In offsetting the expected declining trend in customs taxes, increasing trends in other 
taxes collected at customs needs to be taken into account. The revenues collected by the 
Bureau of Customs include VATs and all excise duties falling on imported commodities, such as 
those on fuel products. Clearly, revenues from these sources can dwarf the revenues coming 
from import tariffs. In many developing countries, about one-half of VAT revenues are collected 
by customs offices. As for excise duties, that share can be even higher. As can be seen in 
Figure 1, the trend in Asian countries is for taxes on goods and services to continue to increase 
their share in total tax revenues at the expense of customs taxes and also income taxes.  
 
The next question is, however, whether expanding the revenue base of the FEEP to 
national total revenues would expose recipient LGUs to greater volatility and unpredictability 
than if the internal revenue base was used. The issues of volatility and predictability, not only 
the total pool of resources, were considered in the design of the IRA since the funds actually 
distributed in any one year correspond to the internal revenue collections of previous years.  
                                               
9
 The data are from the International Monetary Fund’s Government Finance Statistics and originally reported in 
Martínez-Vázquez (2010). Note that the Philippines are not included in the group of Asian countries, as this data 
source does not carry information for the Philippines. 
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Table 1: Variation in Total Government Revenues and Selected Tax Revenues, 1990–2007 
  
Standard 
Deviation Mean 
Coefficient of 
Variation Minimum Maximum 
Total revenue 1.5 16.5 0.09 14.4 19.1 
Personal income tax 0.4 2.2 0.20 1.5 3.4 
Corporate income tax 0.4 2.6 0.16 1.8 3.6 
General sales tax 0.2 1.8 0.13 1.5 2.3 
Excise duties 0.6 2.5 0.24 1.5 3.4 
Customs duties 1.0 3.6 0.29 2.4 5.2 
Source: Author's calculations based on International Monetary Fund (http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/gfs/manual/ 
gfs.htm) 
 
 
Some components of the revenues collected by the Bureau of Customs, such as excise 
taxes on fuel, can exhibit greater volatility than internal or domestically collected taxes. In  
Figures 3 and 4, the two measures of dispersion, the standard deviation and the coefficient of 
variation for annual revenue flows of individual revenue components, are the largest for customs 
duties. Although the standard deviation for total revenue is higher, once normalized by the mean 
value, the coefficient of variation for total revenue is smaller than that of customs duties. Since 
the revenues from customs duties are likely highly correlated with the general sales tax and 
excise duties collected by the Bureau of Customs, those revenues also exhibit more volatility 
than internal revenues, including revenues from the general sales tax and excise duties 
collected by the Bureau of Internal Revenue. For the fuel tax, a separate time series is 
unavailable. However, a large part of this tax is collected upon importation, and its revenues 
(and volatility) are incorporated in the excise duties collected at the Bureau of Customs. 
 
 
Figure 3: Government Total Revenues and Selected Tax Revenue Collection 
(% gross domestic product) 
 
Source: International Monetary Fund (http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/gfs/manual/gfs.htm) 
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Figure 4: Government Total Revenues and Selected Tax Revenue Collection 
(% gross domestic product) 
 
VAT = Value-added tax. 
Source: Government of the Philippines, Department of Finance. 
 
 
Figure 5 shows the time evolution of two possible bases, internal revenues versus total 
revenues. Independent of the total amounts, the two series follow each other closely. The 
coefficient of variation for total revenues is 0.103, and for internal revenues, it is 0.092. 
Therefore, expanding the computation base for the FEEP to total revenues (from internal 
revenues used now for the IRA) only slightly increases the overall volatility of this transfer with 
some increased uncertainty and unpredictability for the recipient LGUs. This additional factor 
should be taken into account in deciding the computational base of the FEEP. 
 
 
Figure 5: Tax Revenue and Internal Revenue Collection 
(% gross domestic product) 
 
Source: Government of the Philippines, Department of Finance. 
 III. APPORTIONING THE ADDITIONAL FUNDING AMONG THE 
DIFFERENT GROUPS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS 
 
Currently, the IRA is subject to a vertical distribution formula that provides 23% of its funds to 
provincial governments, 23% to cities, 34% to municipalities, and 20% to barangays. This 
vertical distribution formula appears to have been the product of political compromise at the time 
of its approval in Parliament as opposed to any calculated weighing of the expenditure needs 
and fiscal capacity of the different groups of LGUs.  
 
The choice of vertical distribution shares for the IRA has had important consequences 
on the overall performance of that transfer. In particular, there is a widely shared perception that 
the share of funds assigned to municipalities has been insufficient and has caused many to 
operate under grave fiscal conditions. The perception is also that something similar can be said 
for the provinces, many of which seem to be operating with significant difficulties. On the 
contrary, cities—the larger, richer cities—have been enjoying funds beyond their needs, even 
though there are smaller, relatively poorer cities that are not so well off. For barangays, the 
general perception is that there are no alarming financing issues and that they are fine with the 
IRA.  
 
The relative poor position of LGUs reflects the fact that the current IRA horizontal 
distribution formula may not capture their expenditure needs nor differences in tax or revenue 
capacity. However, the current percent shares do not reflect the overall aggregate differences in 
expenditure needs and fiscal capacity. Unfortunately, the statements above are conjectures 
based on field observations of different stakeholders of the decentralization system in the 
Philippines as opposed to the results of hard calculations.  
 
Nevertheless, these observations are significant for the vertical allocation of the FEEP. 
However, without hard evidence on expenditure needs and fiscal capacity of the different LGUs, 
a sound basis does not exist to recommend any specific vertical allocation rule.  
 
At this stage, there are two ways to proceed. One approach is to allocate the FEEP 
vertically only among those groups of LGUs that seem to be in more dire fiscal situations, that 
is, municipalities and provinces. Some rule would then need to be devised to divide the FEEP 
between those two groups, for example, two-thirds for municipalities and one-third for provinces. 
Again, there is no basis to propose a specific cut. The advantage of this approach is its 
simplicity and ease of application. However, it may be politically too divisive, as there are 
relatively poor, smaller cities that would be left out of the additional funds. Also, barangays may 
strongly object when their entire group is left out of any additional financing.  
 
A second approach is to devise transparent methodologies for estimating the differences 
between expenditure needs and fiscal capacity (or fiscal gaps) of LGUs in each group. A couple 
of such approaches are proposed in the next section. Obtaining a fiscal gap for each LGU 
allows aggregation of all of the positive gaps (i.e., for those LGUs for which the estimates of 
expenditure need to exceed the estimate of fiscal capacity) in each group. Thus, in theory, those 
aggregate estimates could be used to redo the vertical distribution formula of the FEEP and 
possibly of the IRA, sometime in the future.  
 
However, at this stage, the estimates of expenditure needs and fiscal capacity are 
conditional on the level of resources available to each group of LGUs as a whole. This means 
that the estimates of fiscal gaps are not independent of the existing vertical distribution formula 
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for the IRA. Nevertheless, this information could be helpful in deciding on the direction for the 
desirable reform of the vertical distribution formula of the IRA, and therefore for its application to 
the FEEP. In the future, using the methodologies introduced in this paper, it will be possible to 
develop estimates of fiscal gaps that are independent of the IRA distribution formula. That will 
require making normative decisions about standard expenditure needs, which are only at the 
prerogative of the government. 
 
 IV. ALTERNATIVE FORMULA FOR THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE 
ADDITIONAL FUNDS TO QUALIFYING LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS 
 
The horizontal distribution formula for the IRA uses a weighted index approach with three 
variables: population, land area, and equal sharing. In the cases of provinces, cities, and 
municipalities, the weights are 50% for population, 25% for land area, and 25% for equal 
sharing. For the case of barangays, only two variables are used, population with a weight of 
60% and equal sharing with a weight of 40%. 
 
The overall intent of the IRA is to work as a general allocation transfer to address a large 
vertical fiscal imbalance for LGUs regarding their expenditure obligations and autonomous 
revenue sources.10 In this sense, the IRA appears to have performed satisfactorily, even when 
there is not a good measure of expenditure needs by the different groups of LGUs and therefore 
a good measure of vertical fiscal imbalance. 
 
Most agree that the IRA has been defective in addressing horizontal imbalances in 
expenditure needs and fiscal capacities, both across groups of LGUs and within each of these 
groups. Across groups of LGUs, the vertical share allocation, as noted in the previous section, 
does not take into account either aggregate expenditure needs nor aggregate fiscal capacity of 
each group. Within each group, the IRA horizontal allocation formula only partially takes into 
account the expenditure needs of each LGU within the group and completely ignores the fiscal 
capacity issue. In particular, population and land area variables are likely able to capture 
differences in expenditure needs but not all of the relevant differences. For example, different 
population groups, such as the very young, elderly, or poor, imply different needs than the 
regular adult population. There may also be differences in costs for the delivery of different 
services because of geography (e.g., mountains or isolated islands), population density, or 
proximity conditions. 
 
In addition, the equal sharing is less likely to reflect expenditure need differences. The 
use of this variable in the formula may be justified because of the fixed costs of operating an 
LGU, given that smaller LGUs are unable to capture economies of scale in the operation of 
services. However, this type of variable tends to benefit smaller LGUs in an exaggerated way, 
especially when the weight attached to this variable is relatively large. At the same time, it tends 
to provide a perverse incentive against jurisdictional consolidation if not a further incentive 
toward further jurisdictional fragmentation.  
 
Thus, the IRA has failed to equalize enough within and across each group of LGUs. 
Even in the group that appears to be best off—cities—some units are struggling to meet their 
demands for services (i.e., smaller and more geographically distant cities), while other LGUs 
(i.e., large cities) seem to be much better off and have substantial reserves that overwhelm any 
IRA allocations. Therefore, if the FEEP is to achieve greater equity, the current IRA horizontal 
distribution formula cannot be used for the allocation of its additional funds. 
 
To advance in the direction of a more equitable distribution of funds, two main 
requirements must be met: (i) an improved measurement or approximation of the expenditure 
                                               
10
 The vertical fiscal imbalance refers to the difference in fiscal gaps (i.e., expenditure needs minus fiscal capacity) 
between the central government and the aggregate of subnational governments. Usually the central government 
has a negative fiscal gap (i.e., potential revenue exceeds expenditure need). Subnational governments have a 
positive gap (i.e., expenditure needs exceeding their own revenue capacity). The vertical fiscal imbalance is thus 
closed by using transfers from the central to subnational governments.  
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needs of each LGU, and (ii) the incorporation of some measurement (or approximation) of the 
fiscal capacity of each LGU. 
 
The theory and best international practices in the design of equalization grants should 
help define those two elements in the design of the horizontal distribution formula for the FEEP. 
Before discussing approaches to measuring expenditure needs and fiscal capacity to compute 
the fiscal gap for each LGU, a minimum first approach, which is basically a weighted index 
approach, must be explored.  
 
A. Expanding the Weighted Index Formula in the Internal Revenue Allotment 
 
Although this is the approach currently used for the IRA, the proposed approach includes an 
additional variable for better approximating expenditure needs as well as one as a proxy for 
fiscal capacity. However, this approach falls short of computing a fiscal gap for each LGU; 
therefore, it only distributes the pool of available funds by formula. This distribution of funds will 
be more equalizing, because it does take into account differences in fiscal capacity and 
provides better bases to approximate expenditure needs. Although only one index formula 
applicable to the three groups of LGUs (i.e., provinces, cities, and municipalities) is presented, a 
separate index could be used for each group, because the factors included in the index try to 
approximate the fundamentals behind expenditure needs for each group. Since the expenditure 
responsibilities, and therefore the expenditure needs of each group, can differ, the factors 
capturing those needs could also vary. 
 
The extended index approach is as follows:11 
 
AIi = λ1(Popi/ΣPopi) + λ2(Areai/ΣAreai) + λ3(YoungPopi/ΣYoungPopi) 
+ λ4(OldPopi/ΣOldPopi) + λ5(PovPopi/ΣPovPopi) + λ6(RFCi) 
 
Actual FEEP transfer to LGU i = FEEPi = AIi x Total pool of funds available for the FEEP 
transfer in each group of LGUs12 
where, 
AIi = allocation index (or participation share in the pool of funds, in percentage terms) for 
jurisdiction i in the total pool available for transfers for each group 
Popi/ΣPopi = share of population for jurisdiction i in the total population computed for 
each group  
Areai/ΣAreai = share of urban area for jurisdiction i in the total area for each group 
YoungPopi/ΣYoungPopi = share of population under age 5 years for jurisdiction i in the 
total population computed for each group 
OldPopi/ΣOldPopi = share of population over age 65 years for jurisdiction i in the total 
population computed for each group  
PovPopi/ΣPovPopi = share of population living in poverty for jurisdiction i in the total 
population computed for each group  
RFCi (Relative Fiscal Capacityi) = [Max FC – FCi]/Σ[Max FC – Average FC] 
                                               
11
 It should be clear that the contribution here is the proposition of an expanded index formula that is more  
encompassing of expenditure needs and fiscal capacity. At this stage, the actual additional factors included should 
be treated more like an example of what can be done than a firm proposal of how a final index formula would look. 
Other factors may be included as relevant and for which objective reliable data can be obtained. One set of factors 
not captured in the index formula, but which may be quite relevant, are those measuring cost differences across 
jurisdictions in the provision of public services.  
12
 As mentioned, barangays are not included in the discussion. However, if they were included, the expanded formula 
here could be adapted to the information available for barangays, as is now the case in the IRA transfer. 
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Where fiscal capacity is being measured as indicated in the next subsection of the 
paper, and where  
λ1 ……λ6 = relative weights for each of the factors in the formula  
λ1+ λ2 + λ3 + λ4 + λ5 + λ6 = 1, and  
ΣAIi = 1 
 
Two sets of decisions are important to make this approach operational: (i) the proper 
values of the weights for each of the factors in the formula, and (ii) how to divide the pool of 
available funds for the FEEP among the groups of LGUs. Unfortunately, there are no clear, 
exact objective criteria for these choices.  
 
The selection of the weight factors (e.g., λ1 and λ2) involves both technical and 
inescapable political elements. Expert technical analysis within the Philippines from those who 
intimately know LGU budgets must be used to gauge the relative importance of population and 
land area in the determination of expenditure needs.13 Note that the factors approximating 
expenditure needs are those from 1 to 5.14 In the same manner, technical expertise should be 
used in assessing the impact of fiscal capacity in the relative position (truly, the fiscal gap) for 
the different LGUs. This is approximated with a factor of 6. The stronger weight given to fiscal 
capacity, the smaller the aggregate weight given to expenditure needs. This follows clearly from 
the condition that λ1+ λ2 + λ3 + λ4 + λ5 + λ6 = 1, and so that λ6 = 1 – (λ1 + λ2 + λ3 + λ4 + λ5).  
 
For the purpose of the numerical simulations, the following values are assumed for the 
weights, but these values are subject to revision and sensitivity analysis: 
λ1 = 0.35 
λ2 = 0.10 
λ3 = 0.10 
λ4 = 0.10  
λ5 = 0.10 
λ6 = 0.25 
 
There is no clear way to divide the available FEEP funds among the different groups of 
LGUs without computing fiscal gaps for LGUs. At this stage, there are several options that are 
available: (i) use the same vertical apportionment as in the IRA; (ii) exclude the barangays, and 
divide the available funds between the other three groups; or (iii) also exclude cities as a group, 
and use the FEEP funds only for groups of LGUs that are widely acknowledged to be in the 
most need. Of course, the consequences of selecting one vertical apportionment rule or another 
are of much consequence. As an example, if the second rule is applied, 28.75% of the funds go 
to the provinces, 28.75% go to the cities, and 42.50% go to the municipalities.  
 
Using the most recent data available for 2008, the summary statistics for the FEEP 
transfers to three groups of LGUs are shown in Table 2, where the adjusted weighted index 
formula is used for the horizontal distribution within each group and the adjusted IRA vertical 
distribution, as discussed above, to apportion the available funds between the three groups. For 
the pool of FEEP funds to be distributed in 2008, P53,484.3 million was used for an IRA pool of 
                                               
13
 See Appendix 1 for a discussion of the potential rationale behind the weight factors. 
14
 Of course, other factors could be included, and even some could be excluded. Here, the authors’ best judgment is 
used based on international practice and current data constraints. The variable measuring relative poverty, 
PovPopi/ΣPovPopi, is taken here to approximate certain forms of expenditure needs. However, this variable could 
also be taken to capture some elements of fiscal capacity, but this is not being done here. Fiscal capacity is being 
measured independently through the RFC variable. 
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funds of P213,937.2 million. An example of the necessary computations is shown in Appendix 4 
for the case of some provinces.15 
 
 
Table 2: Per Capita Fiscal Equity and Expenditure Performance Fund Transfers  
under the Adjusted Weighted Index Horizontal Distribution Formula and  
Adjusted Internal Revenue Allotment Vertical Distribution Rule 
(P, simulated for 2008) 
 
Provinces Cities Municipalities 
Minimum 140.21 258.26 219.75 
Maximum 704.98 1,179.76 19,507.67 
Average 288.94 648.14 540.07 
Standard deviation 117.22 235.74 579.02 
Coefficient of variation 0.41 0.36 1.07 
Total FEEP transfers 
(P million) 
15,376.74 15,376. 74 22,730.83 
FEEP = Fiscal Equity and Expenditure Performance Fund. 
 
 
B. Distributing the Fiscal Equity and Expenditure Performance Fund  
on the Basis of Estimated Fiscal Gaps of Local Government Units 
 
This is a different approach that represents a significant departure from the index approach 
used in the IRA. This approach is based on the estimation for each LGU of a fiscal gap as the 
difference between its expenditure needs arising from the current assignment of expenditure 
responsibilities and its fiscal capacity based on own revenues and also all received transfers 
and revenue sharing.  
 
Fiscal Gapi = Expenditure Needsi – Fiscal Capacityi 
 
Note that fiscal capacity measures all of the potential available resources to the LGU 
other than the specific transfer, so it includes the own fiscal capacity coming from own taxes 
and fees as well as any shared revenues and all transfers, including the IRA. 
 
First, the expression for the fiscal gap needs to be estimated for each LGU in each of the 
three groups of LGUs (i.e., provinces, cities, and municipalities). For every LGU within each 
group that does not have a positive fiscal gap (FGi < 0), FGi = 0 is set. Then, an aggregate fiscal 
gap for each group can be defined. 
 
Σ Fiscal Gapi for provinces, cities, or municipalities) 
 
Although an aggregate fiscal gap for each group is being estimated and they all are 
measured in pesos, the aggregates for the groups are not necessarily comparable because the 
processes used to estimate expenditure needs and fiscal capacity are conditional on the 
existing data and the averages for each group. Thus, there would be some LGUs in each group 
with positive fiscal gaps, indicating a need for additional financing, when it may be possible that 
in some normative absolute terms all or most LGUs in one group can be in better financial 
                                               
15
 Note that the maximum value for the municipalities is an outlier due to the current data for Kalayaan municipality, 
which belongs to Palawan Province (Region IV-B). This municipality, which is a tourist destination, has a 
population of 53 but relatively large revenues and expenditures.  
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positions than all or most LGUs in another group. The methodologies discussed below can 
provide the basis for those normative comparisons, but this paper will not introduce any 
normative absolute standards for LGUs. 
 
Nevertheless, the aggregate fiscal gap for each group of LGUs indicates the number of 
LGUs in each group that appears to be in a deficit or positive fiscal gap situation. So, in 
principle, those aggregate amounts can help inform changes in the apportionment of the 
available funds in the FEEP across provinces, cities, and municipalities. 
 
In addition, the aggregate fiscal gap for each LGU group can be used to distribute the 
funds from the FEEP if a vertical distribution of these funds is accepted as used currently in the 
IRA or other vertical apportionments discussed in the previous section. To see how this would 
work, the two steps for each group of LGUs are: 
(i)  Define the relative fiscal gap. The relative fiscal gap is the relative size of each 
locality’s fiscal gap as a share of the aggregate fiscal gaps of all localities: 
Relative Fiscal Gapi = Fiscal Gapi/ΣFiscal Gapj 
(ii)  Assign equalization transfer. The equalization transfer to local governmenti is 
defined as 
FEEP Transfer to Localityi = Relative Fiscal Gapi* Part of FEEP Funds for the 
Group of LGUs.16 
 
Notice that different from the extended index approach discussed above, using the fiscal 
gap approach does not produce a FEEP transfer for each LGU in the group. Instead, only those 
LGUs with a positive fiscal gap are recipients of the FEEP. This has the advantage of being 
more equalizing, since only those LGUs that cannot cover their expenditure needs with the 
available resources would get the grant. 
 
As an example, the vertical distribution rule for the FEEP is assumed the same as the 
one used above to illustrate the extended index approach, so that 28.75% of the FEEP funds go 
to provinces, 28.75% go to cities, and 42.50% go to municipalities. These simulations are 
shown after the review and application of the methodologies to compute expenditure needs and 
fiscal capacity. 
 
In practice, there are a handful of methods that can be used to estimate expenditure 
needs. Something similar holds for fiscal capacity. These methods used in international 
practices are summarized in Appendix 1 and Appendix 2.  
 
                                               
16
 Instead of a proportional approach, a mini-max approach can be applied to the final allocation of transfers. With 
this approach, LGUs in each group are sorted in ascending order by the size of their fiscal disparities. The idea is 
to start from the bottom, allocating transfers first to those LGUs with the largest fiscal gap and then moving up the 
ranks. The pool of available FEEP funds is eventually exhausted so that the last LGU receiving the grant funds 
reports a fiscal gap exactly equal to all those below. Note that not all LGUs with a positive fiscal gap may receive 
funds under this approach. 
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C. Approaches to Estimating Expenditure Needs 
 
Below are two possible approaches to estimate the expenditure needs of LGUs. 
 
1. Estimation of Expenditure Needs Using per Client Expenditure Norms 
(EN1) 
 
The essence of this methodology is to determine, for each significant functional service 
of an LGU, a financial standard or norm per client or user of the service (e.g., if LGUs were 
responsible for elementary education, how many pesos per year would be allocated for each 
elementary school student in the Philippines; this amount could be adjusted up or down with a 
cost index for delivering this service).17 This is informed by practice but also a normative 
budgeting approach in which the authorities establishing budget priorities determine how much 
is desirable and affordable to spend on different services. As budget priorities change over time, 
so would the per client expenditure norms for different services. The apparent problem is that no 
one has stated what these financial per client norms should be for any service in the Philippines. 
However, the actual executed budgets of last year contain all necessary data to compute the 
implicit per client financial norms.  
 
Following the same example, the implicit budget norm for elementary education can be 
obtained as the total sum spent on elementary education by all LGUs divided by the total 
number of elementary school children in the country. Note that the expenditure norm is common 
to all LGUs in the absence of variations in cost provision.18 Once the methodology is established 
using historical budget data, the budget norms can be changed in every budget period.  
 
The concept of potential users or clients deserves special attention. Users or clients are 
defined as all possible recipients of the services provided by a municipal government, which do 
not necessarily correspond to the total population but could also represent a specific segment, 
such as the elderly, students, or the population of a particular geographic area. Additionally, it is 
important to distinguish between the potential users and those actually benefiting from the 
services, since the last group might exclude eligible users due to, for instance, budgetary 
limitations. Expenditure needs must be computed taking into account all eligible inhabitants (still 
using the elementary education example, this means that the potential users include all children 
of elementary school age, whether or not enrolled).  
 
The practical steps are as follows. 
 
Step 1: Determine the expenditure aggregates or envelopes for each local 
government unit function. The application of this methodology requires the classification of 
municipal expenditures in terms of the functions or services that the law has defined as a 
responsibility of LGUs, as well as demographic information to identify the amount of users from 
each of these services.  
 
                                               
17
 This determination of the per client expenditure norm can be done top-down and bottom-up. As discussed in 
Appendix 2, a bottom-up methodology relies on the costing of the different elements of the service related to some 
physical standards. This approach requires a lot of time and economic effort to put together, and it risks arriving at 
per user or client standards that are essentially unaffordable.  
18
 This methodology and others that are used to estimate expenditure needs are budget preparation tools. In terms of 
budget execution, the client-based expenditure norm may have a prescriptive character, forcing LGUs to spend 
according to the established norm, or it may just be optional, in which case LGUs are allowed to decide a different 
amount of expenditure per client. The international practice on this is varied. 
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The methodology of expenditure norms by client requires establishing the total amount 
of resources actually spent (and in future years, what the central government will determine) for 
each local service or function. To make the procedure even simpler, it is possible to group those 
functions with common users, or alternatively, to choose only the most important ones, while the 
number of users for the remaining functions is assumed to be equal to the population. Using 
historical expenditure data has the advantage of being feasible, because it is based on effective 
expenditures incurred in the provision of local services in the country.19 
 
The budget data for 2008 identify nine functional categories of local public expenditure:  
(i) general public service; (ii) education, culture, and sports; (iii) health, nutrition, and population 
control; (iv) labor and employment; (v) housing and community development; (vi) social security, 
social services, and welfare; (vii) economic services; (viii) debt servicing; and (ix) other 
purposes. The estimation of expenditure needs under the per client expenditure norms 
methodology requires the calculation of the numbers of the clients for each of the above 
categories of expenditures.  
 
Local expenditure on general public services cannot be assigned to a particular 
demographic group. Instead, as this function benefits the community as a whole, the total 
population in the locality is defined as the client base for this service. For similar reasons, 
economic services, debt servicing, and other expenditures are also spread among the whole 
population of the locality.  
 
In the case of education, culture, and sports, LGUs are generally responsible for the 
provision of public school, which includes public kindergarten, primary schools, and high 
schools. Therefore, the population between ages 4–17 years is defined as the number of 
potential clients for education services. Regarding culture and sports, the users of these 
services are assumed to be concentrated in the adult population before retirement, which 
covers the range between ages 18–65 years. In sum, ages 4–65 years are the potential client 
numbers for this expenditure category.  
 
The benefits of local expenditure in the area of health, nutrition, and population control 
are mainly limited to some specific groups, such as children and the elderly. However, services 
are sometimes also provided to a more broad population. To capture this, a weighted population 
is defined, with double weights for population under age 5 years and over age 65 years, with a 
single weight for the rest of the population (ages 5–65 years), as the potential client numbers of 
this expenditure category.  
 
Services for labor and employment are oriented to the adult population before 
retirement, so the number of potential clients is estimated as the population between ages 18 
and 65 years.  
 
The expenditure on housing and community development include services such as 
water supply and sanitation, public lighting, natural gas infrastructure, and other communal 
services. In general, most of these public services benefit entire families, especially poor 
families, rather than a particular age or demographic group. Therefore, the number of poor 
                                               
19
 If the potential users are more than those historically benefited, the historical expenditure starting point could 
become an unfeasible standard. 
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households is used as an indicator of need, and the expenditure norm is developed for housing 
and community development services on that basis.20 
 
Social security, social services, and welfare is probably the expenditure function for 
which the client base is more difficult to define. Services in this category are oriented to the 
assistance of very specific groups, including the elderly, disabled, and children from troubled 
social environments. Payments are sometimes also expensed to the unemployed and widows. 
At this time, due to limited data availability, the different client groups cannot be accounted for 
nor their intensity of the use of these services. Therefore, the elderly is assumed as the most 
important group among the beneficiaries of social security, and the number of inhabitants over 
age 65 years is used as the potential client base for these services. 
 
It would be impractical and even misleading to try to define a per client norm for every 
category of local expenditures. A large number of expenditure standards would reduce 
transparency in the system and enhance the likelihood of complex discussions about proper 
client bases. In general, under other expenditures, some functions are unimportant in budgetary 
terms, as well as a varied combination of beneficiaries, so the local population is again the best 
option to estimate the number of clients. 
 
Step 2: Compute per client expenditure norm for each local function. Here, the 
expenditure aggregate (at the national level covering all LGUs) for each function is divided by 
the number of potential clients (also at the national level) of the services being delivered. This 
needs to be done for each of the functional areas, covering the entire budget of LGUs. 
Naturally, the difficulty of this step lies in the identification of potential clients for each service. 
For example, for education, the client base is logically the school-age population. For health, a 
client base can be built that overweighs the very young and elderly populations. For social 
services for the poor, the client base is the population living in poverty. The entire population 
can be used as the default client base for those functions that cannot be allocated to particular 
groups. The criteria opted for in the estimation of the number of clients per expenditure 
category, although well aligned with current international practice, are subject to improvements 
and intended to serve as examples of how the per client expenditure norms should be designed. 
In general, it is crucial to have well-defined expenditure responsibilities.21 
 
Step 3: Compute expenditure needs for each function in each local government 
unit. This can be obtained by multiplying the per client expenditure norm for each local function 
by the client base for that function in the LGU. 
 
Step 4: Compute the total expenditures needs for each local government unit. This 
corresponds to the sum of the expenditure needs for each function in each LGU. 
 
Tables 3, 4, and 5 present the summary of the selected expenditure categories with their 
respective estimated number of clients, together with the respective per client expenditure norm.  
 
                                               
20
 Poverty data for provinces are available for 2009. However, these data are only available for 2003 for cities and 
municipalities. In the simulation analysis, only the data available are used.  
21
 The standards per client can be easily adjusted upward or downward to the different costs of provisions of a 
particular service by applying a relative cost index to the standard. At the present time, there are no reliable data 
on cost differences for service delivery, and therefore no such adjustments are performed. 
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Table 3: Computation of Expenditure Norms for Provinces 
(P, 2008 values) 
Expenditure Category 
Aggregate 
Expenditure Needs 
Estimated Aggregate 
Number of Clients 
Per Client 
Expenditure Norm 
General public services  20,953,886,720 68,607,096 305.42 
Education, culture, and 
sports 
2,315,550,208 57,524,236 40.25 
Health, nutrition, and 
population control 
9,033,858,048 20,681,986 436.80 
Labor and employment 30,161,374 36,050,832 0.84 
Housing and community 
development 
827,712,832 3,781,205 218.90 
Social security, social 
services, and welfare 
972,983,232 3,030,817 321.03 
Economic services 9,900,763,136 68,607,096 144.31 
Debt servicing 1,594,355,840 68,607,096 23.24 
Other purposes 10,519,157,760 68,607,096 153.32 
 
 
Table 4: Computation of Expenditure Norms for Cities 
(P, 2008 values) 
Expenditure Category 
Aggregate 
Expenditure Needs 
Estimated Aggregate 
Number of Clients 
Per Client 
Expenditure Norm 
General public services  39,109,013,504 32,957,168 1,186.66 
Education, culture, and 
sports 
9,308,789,760 27,868,748 334.02 
Health, nutrition, and 
population control 
7,384,459,264 9,508,969 776.58 
Labor and employment 45,499,684 18,663,172 2.44 
Housing and community 
development 
3,182,292,480 4,314,455 737.59 
Social security, social 
services, and welfare 
2,156,575,232 1,191,232 1,810.37 
Economic services 14,982,636,544 32,957,168 454.61 
Debt servicing 4,642,338,816 32,957,168 140.86 
Other purposes 13,723,859,968 32,957,168 416.42 
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Table 5: Computation of Expenditure Norms for Municipalities 
(P, 2008 values) 
Expenditure Category 
Aggregate 
Expenditure Needs 
Estimated Aggregate 
Number of Clients 
Per Client 
Expenditure Norm 
General public services  43,324,829,696 55,436,636 781.52 
Education, culture, and 
sports 
2,286,163,456 46,164,100 49.52 
Health, nutrition, and 
population control 
6,438,859,776 16,678,747 386.05 
Labor and employment 69,520,528 28,752,384 2.42 
Housing and community 
development 
983,428,864 18,695,866 52.60 
Social security, social 
services, and welfare 
2,517,392,896 2,469,623 1,019.34 
Economic services 10,452,777,984 55,436,636 188.55 
Debt servicing 1,476,958,336 55,436,636 26.64 
Other purposes 15,960,967,168 55,436,636 287.91 
 
 
In Appendix 5, a sample of the data generated is provided to arrive to the expenditure 
needs of each LGU. 
 
2. Estimation of Expenditure Needs Using Weighted Indexes (EN2) 
 
An alternative method for the estimation of expenditure needs is to use an adjusted 
version of the weighted index developed in the previous section.22 For this purpose, first, it is 
necessary to obtain an aggregate estimate of expenditure needs for all LGUs in each group. 
These are called LENp, LENc, and LENm, representing, respectively, the aggregate 
expenditure needs for the provinces (p), cities (c), and municipalities (m). For operational 
purposes, those aggregate expenditure needs are assumed to be equal to the aggregate 
executed expenditures in the last year in each group. These aggregates can be adjusted in 
different forms. Historical expenditures of last year can be adjusted upward to the current year 
by applying a growth index that may include the rate of inflation and real growth. Also, each of 
the aggregates could be adjusted up or down depending on prior perceptions that some of the 
aggregates may underrepresent needs (perhaps the case of municipalities and provinces) or 
overrepresent needs (perhaps in the case of cities). In future years, the same approach could 
be used, and the political factor can and should become more explicit in the setting and 
reordering of expenditure priorities from the top down.  
 
Second, it is necessary to adjust the index formula used above so that it includes only 
those factors representing expenditure needs. As pointed out above, the index could be 
different for the different groups, thus reflecting differences in expenditure needs. Here, an 
adjusted index is used that excludes the fiscal capacity factor: 
 
AAIi = λ1(Popi/ΣPopi) + λ2(Areai/ΣAreai) + λ3(YoungPopi/ΣYoungPopi) 
+ λ4(OldPopi/ΣOldPopi) + λ5(PovPopi/ΣPovPopi) 
 
This index has the same properties as above, and so they will not be repeated here. 
Below are the steps involved in estimating expenditure needs with this approach. 
                                               
22
 However, recall that the index formula is used to distribute the available funds in the FEEP. Here, the index formula 
is used differently, that is, to compute expenditure needs. 
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Step 1: Determine the aggregate level of local expenditure needs (LENp, LENc, 
LENm). These can be based on the most recent historical data, but these data can be adjusted 
in different ways. In the computation, executed budget data for 2008 are used, and no 
adjustments are made. 
 
Step 2: Select expenditure needs factors. The expenditure needs factors selected can 
differ among the groups of LGUs. Here, population, land area, youth population, elderly 
population, and population living in poverty are used. 
 
Step 3: Compute each local government unit’s relative need for each factor. The 
share of population for each LGU in the entire population is Popi/ΣPopi (and so on).  
 
Step 4: Determine the relative importance or weights of each needs factor. The 
weights are assumed to be λ1 = 0.40, λ2 = 0.15, λ3 = 0.15, λ4 = 0.15, and λ5 = 0.15. Other sets of 
weights could be assumed and be simulated.  
 
Step 5: Calculate the expenditure need for locality i. This is 
Needip
 
= AAIip · LENp for provinces  
Needic = AAIic · LENc for cities 
Needim = AAIim · LENm for provinces 
A summary of the computation is shown in Table 6, and an example of the data 
computation to arrive at the results is shown in Appendix 6. 
 
 
Table 6: Per Capita Expenditure Needs Using Weighted Index Formula 
(P, descriptive statistics for 2008) 
 
Provinces Cities Municipalities 
Minimum 567.15 1,991.18 968.02 
Maximum 1,844.61 6,997.48 107,315.7 
Average 899.68 3,541.45 1,762.22 
Standard deviation 186.90 1,222.11 2,824.68 
Coefficient of variation 0.21 0.35 1.60 
 
 
D. Approaches to Estimating Fiscal Capacity 
 
Fiscal capacity has been defined as the potential revenue that an LGU can raise from its tax 
base, exerting an average level of effort. To measure fiscal capacity, it is natural to focus on 
those revenue sources over which LGUs have a certain degree of autonomy (i.e., the capacity 
to modify either the base or the rates applied). These are usually referred to as own revenues. 
Other revenues, such as shared taxes and transfers, provide LGUs with revenues, but since 
they cannot be directly affected by LGUs, they can be accounted for directly by the amounts 
actually received by LGUs for those concepts.  
 
The adequate estimation of local fiscal capacity becomes important because of the 
ability that LGUs have to affect actual tax collections. As the fiscal gap (and thus the FEEP 
transfer actually received) is expected to be larger with lower fiscal capacity, there may be an 
incentive for government officials to reduce tax effort from their own revenue sources (i.e., those 
over which they can exert effective autonomy). In contrast, as remarked above, those other 
revenue sources not subject to the influence of LGU actions, such as shared taxes or other 
transfers, do not present any difficulty in this regard. For revenues outside of the control of 
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LGUs, historical or actual revenues usually represent a good approximation to revenue 
collection capacity. 
 
The problem of estimating fiscal capacity is therefore reduced to the adequate 
estimation of properly defined own revenues. Overall, fiscal capacity is thus defined as the sum 
of estimated potential own revenues (EORi), and all other shared revenues and transfers 
received (OT) other than the FEEP transfer. The fiscal capacity of an LGU i can then be 
computed as 
 
FCi = EORi + OTi 
 
Unfortunately, there is usually a lack of data on tax bases, which limits the ability to 
estimate own revenue capacity. Nevertheless, there is information on cadastral values for the 
property taxes, which is used.  
 
Regardless of the methodology used to estimate potential own revenues, overall per 
capita fiscal capacity is obtained, as shown in the formula, by adding up the estimate of own 
revenues to the actual shared revenue shares and all transfers (except for those received from 
the FEEP).  
 
In the following discussion, two methodologies are presented for estimating potential 
own revenues (EORi).  
 
1. Estimation of Fiscal Capacity Using Average of Past Collection Ratios (FCi) 
 
In the absence of detailed local data, the estimation of fiscal capacity can be based on 
historical information available for local fiscal revenues. In general terms, this methodology can 
be described by the following procedure. 
 
Step 1: Select the revenue sources and time periods that help estimate the ability 
of local government units to collect their own revenues (ORi), and for which complete 
information is available. It is useful to use, for example, average data for the last 3 years. The 
categories considered in the estimation should be those for which LGUs have some discretion 
or ability to change the effort of collection. Thus, this category should include fully assigned 
taxes to LGUs plus all user fees and charges. 
 
Step 2: Compute revenues based on the local revenue source j, Fj, for each local 
government unit i, and do the same at the national level for all local government units in 
the same group. The following can be defined. 
 Fij = local revenues from j as the revenue from source j in each in LGU i and 
FNj = total revenues in group from j 
 
as the revenue in the set of all LGUs in the group from source j. It follows that total current own 
revenues for LGU i is given by ΣjFij and for the entire group of LGUs by ΣjFNj. 
 
The estimation of fiscal capacity should be based on potential revenues. As explained, 
the use of historical or actual fiscal revenues might result in providing perverse incentives to 
LGUs. A practical way of facing this problem is to consider an average of the relative (with 
respect to the national level) per capita tax collections for a relatively longer period of time (e.g., 
3 years) as an indicator of local fiscal capacity. The idea is in using averages of several periods, 
it will become more difficult for LGUs to alter the indicator of relative fiscal capacity.  
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Step 3: Compute the index of relative fiscal capacity, IRFCi, for each group of local 
government units. Provinces, cities, and municipalities can be defined as the historical 
average (2008–2010) of ΣjFij/ΣjFNj representing the relation between the own revenue of local 
unit i and the one for the entire group. 
 
Step 4: Compute the fiscal capacity for each municipality i in each group. This 
should be as FCi = IRFCi aggregate forecast of collections for the entire group, such that FCi 
can be interpreted as the amount of collections that an LGU would have in the projected period. 
For the purpose of the simulations, the aggregate own revenue collections for each group of the 
last year available are used as a way to define the aggregate forecast of collections for the 
entire group. Note that the aggregate forecast of collections for the entire group for future years 
could be obtained by applying a growth index to the base year based on the inflation rate and 
some estimate of real growth for the main tax bases. 
 
Although, presently, implementation of this methodology is less than ideal, it may be a 
good alternative to estimate potential own revenues and fiscal capacity of LGUs in the short 
term. The data required in this approach are not difficult to generate, and the use of several 
periods provides a simple, effective way to reduce the perverse incentive problem. 
 
A sample of the data and procedures to estimate the capacity with the average of past 
collection ratios is shown in Appendix 7 while the summary descriptive statistics are shown in 
Table 7.  
 
 
Table 7: Per Capita Fiscal Capacity Using Average of Past Collection Ratios 
(P, descriptive statistics) 
 Provinces  Cities  Municipalities  
Minimum 431.87 1,434.61 441.95 
Maximum 11,126.72 15,526.94 269,194.9 
Average 1,357.81 3,464.35 2,288.65 
Standard deviation 1,295.27 1,582.38 7,105.55 
Coefficient of variation 0.95 0.46 3.10 
 
 
2. Estimation of Fiscal Capacity Using Basic Proxies (FC2) 
 
Another methodology that can be used to calculate local fiscal capacity is to employ a 
proxy that is highly correlated with an LGU’s capacity to collect revenues. Ideally, some 
measure of gross local product or per capita income would be used, but lacking those data, 
property value assessments are used here as a proxy for the entire own revenue capacity. This 
is less than ideal because a good proxy requires that LGUs do not have any capacity to modify 
the values that the proxy takes.  
 
The logic behind using property value assessments is that (i) it is the variable available 
that is close to some measure of tax bases; and (ii) that is not unreasonable to think that if 
assessed values are high, other tax bases in LGUs are also likely to be high. That is, property 
value assessments are highly correlated with other local tax bases. Unfortunately, only property 
value assessments for provinces and cities are available. Therefore, this measure of fiscal 
capacity, FC2, is only calculated for provinces and cities in this paper.  
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The basic regressions of local own revenues on property value assessments are shown 
in Table 8. The relative high values of the R-square indicate a good fit and high explanatory 
power of the chosen proxy. The summary statistics for the estimated fiscal capacity are shown 
in Table 9. Cities, on average and as expected, have higher per capita fiscal capacity, more 
than double the per capita capacity of provinces. The variation in the estimates is larger in the 
case of the provinces as measured by the coefficient of variation.  
 
 
Table 8: Property Value Assessments as a Proxy Variable for Local Own Revenues 
 Province  City  Municipality  
 Coefficients t-Stat Coefficients t-Stat Coefficients t-Stat 
Constant 4.69e+07 4.28 1.50e+07 0.40 … … 
Property tax 
assessment 
coefficient  
.007 13.73 0.042 31.25 … … 
R-square 0.71  0.88  … … 
F-statistic 188.38  976.47  … … 
… = data not available. 
Source: Department of Finance and own calculations. 
 
 
Table 9: Per Capita Fiscal Capacity Using Basic Proxies 
(P, descriptive statistics for 2008) 
 
Provinces Cities Municipalities 
Minimum 433.12 1,416.93 … 
Maximum 10,759.2 12,544.29 … 
Average 1,346.35 3,512.88 … 
Standard deviation 1,255.44 1,575.95 … 
Coefficient of variation 0.93 0.45 … 
… = data not available. 
 
 
E. Coming Up with the Fiscal Gap for Local Government Units 
 
From the combination of the alternative methodologies described above, four measurements of 
fiscal gaps can be derived for the three groups of LGUs. Each measurement leads to a different 
distribution of the FEEP across the LGUs. The four alternatives are presented in the following 
table. 
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Table 10: Alternative Measures of the Fiscal Gap 
  Fiscal Capacity Measurement 
  Average of past collection 
ratios (FC1) 
Basic proxy 
(FC2) 
Expenditure needs 
measurement 
Per client expenditure 
norms (EN1) 
Fiscal gap  
measure 1 
Fiscal gap  
measure 2 
Weighted indexes 
(EN2) 
Fiscal gap  
measure 3 
Fiscal gap  
measure 4 
 
 
Thus, for instance, fiscal gap measure 3 is based on the estimation of expenditure needs 
according to the weighted indexes’ methodology (EN2) and the estimated value of local fiscal 
capacity obtained by using the average of past collection ratios (FC1), such that the fiscal gap 
be defined as:  
 
FG3 = EN2 – FC1 
 
Different measures of fiscal gaps can be obtained from different combinations, and a 
discussion ensues as to which of the available alternatives make more sense to be used in the 
distribution of the FEEP in the short to medium term. In Tables 11 to 13, descriptive statistics 
are presented for the four alternative measures. To make them more comparable, they are 
expressed in per capita terms.  
 
No measure of fiscal gap is superior to another based only on these statistics, but it is 
important to have a notion about the distribution of per capita fiscal gaps to evaluate and 
compare the performance of the alternative methodologies. In truth, what matters is the quality 
of the estimations of expenditure needs and fiscal capacity. The more accurate those 
estimations are, then the more reliable the estimation of per capita fiscal disparities. 
 
For Tables 11 to 13, it is important to note that the results from the four proposals are 
mostly consistent in terms of the determination of LGUs with positive fiscal disparities (i.e., 
expenditure needs greater than fiscal capacities); perhaps the exception is for the case of cities.  
 
 
Table 11: Fiscal Gaps for Provinces 
(P, descriptive statistics 2008 values) 
 
Fiscal Gap 
Measure 1 
Fiscal Gap 
Measure 2 
Fiscal Gap 
Measure 3 
Fiscal Gap 
Measure 4 
Minimum (3,141.47) (3,314.35) (2,685.70) (2,858.58) 
Maximum 375.06 373.81 359.97 358.72 
Range (maximum–minimum) 3,516.53 3,688.16 3,045.67 3,217.30 
Average (413.12) (398.38) (332.89) (318.15) 
Standard deviation 668.93 669.26 556.39 557.41 
Average of positive fiscal disparities 106.15 111.51 126.22 109.86 
Number of localities with positive fiscal 
disparities 
21.00 19.00 16.00 20.00 
( ) = negative. 
 
  
Philippines: Designing a Local Government Enhancement Fund  |  25
Table 12: Fiscal Gaps for Cities 
(P, descriptive statistics 2008 values) 
 Fiscal Gap 
Measure 1 
Fiscal Gap 
Measure 2 
Fiscal Gap 
Measure 3 
Fiscal Gap 
Measure 4 
Minimum (12,754.20) (9,771.62) (13,503.80) (10,521.20) 
Maximum 1,394.33 1,477.18 2,986.23 2,940.93 
Range (maximum–minimum) 14,148.59 11,248.80 16,490.09 13,462.14 
Average (517.18) (559.21) 86.41 27.18 
Standard deviation 1,599.82 1,577.06 1,943.91 1,871.69 
Average of positive fiscal disparities 467.71 488.73 988.12 956.84 
Number of localities with positive fiscal 
disparities 
55.00 54.00 90.00 85.00 
( ) = negative. 
 
 
Table 13: Fiscal Gaps for Municipalities 
(P, descriptive statistics 2008 values) 
 
Fiscal Gap 
Measure 1 
Fiscal Gap 
Measure 2 
Fiscal Gap 
Measure 3 
Fiscal Gap 
Measure 4 
Minimum (26,7796.60) … (16,1879.30) … 
Maximum 1,042.23 … 1,176.10 … 
Range (maximum–minimum) 26,8838.8 … 16,3055.4 … 
Average (776.57) … (530.03) … 
Standard deviation 7,146.20 … 4,372.80 … 
Average of positive fiscal disparities 205.23 … 193.91 … 
Number of localities with positive fiscal 
disparities 
467.00 … 493.00 … 
( ) = negative, … = data not available. 
 
 
As previously mentioned, one of the two most important goals of the FEEP is to reduce 
the differences in fiscal disparities (or fiscal gaps) across LGUs. In practical terms, this requires 
reducing, to a greater extent, the largest local fiscal disparities.  
 
Any measurement of per capita fiscal gap provides a natural criterion for the assignment 
of FEEP funds. Those LGUs with negative fiscal gaps (i.e., fiscal capacity exceeding their 
expenditure needs) do not require, in principle, funds from the FEEP. At the same time, those 
LGUs with larger (i.e., positive) fiscal gaps should receive greater per capita transfers than 
others with smaller fiscal disparities. However, how big a per capital fiscal gap should be to 
define an LGU as a beneficiary and how much more FEEP funds should be given to a relatively 
needy jurisdiction are open questions.  
 
Below, one of several alternative approaches is implemented to apportioning the 
available FEEP funds among LGUs with positive fiscal disparities, known as the proportional 
allocation mechanism. This approach apportions the available transfer funds among LGUs as a 
fixed proportion of their positive fiscal disparities within each group of LGUs. No matter what the 
size of the fiscal disparity, all LGUs with a positive fiscal gap will receive a transfer from the 
FEEP, and the size of the transfer depends on the percentage of total positive disparities 
represented by that LGU and, of course, on the size of the FEEP funds to be transferred. 
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This point returns to the issue of the vertical distribution of the FEEP funds across the 
different LGU groups. Here, two sets of assumptions are made for actually implementing the 
FEEP distributions. In the first case, the vertical distribution assumed in the subsection above is 
repeated, assigning 28.75% of the available FEEP funds to provinces, 28.75% to cities, and 
42.50% to municipalities.  
 
In the second approach, the FEEP funds are apportioned proportionally to the total 
positive fiscal gaps for each group of LGUs. To arrive at these proportions, the positive fiscal 
gaps are added across the three groups of LGUs, and then the proportion for each is derived. 
As discussed above, this approach is far from ideal, because the estimations of fiscal gaps is 
conditional on the current systems of intergovernment finance, including the IRA. In the future, it 
will be possible to arrive at measures of fiscal gaps that are based on normative statements of 
expenditure needs of different LGUs, which will provide a better justification for the vertical 
apportionment of the FEEP funds based on the proportional size of aggregate fiscal gaps for the 
different groups of LGUs. 
 
The results from implementing the proportional allocation mechanism for the FEEP 
funds are below. To divide the available FEEP funds for the three groups of LGUs, the relative 
fiscal gaps are computed for provinces, cities, and municipalities following the steps described 
above. The results for the relative fiscal gaps, which, only apply to those LGUs with positive 
fiscal gaps, are shown in Tables 14 to 16. Examples of the steps followed for these 
computations are shown in Appendix 8.  
 
 
Table 14: Relative Fiscal Gaps for Provinces 
(descriptive statistics) 
 
Relative Fiscal 
Gap Measure 1 
Relative Fiscal 
Gap Measure 2 
Relative Fiscal 
Gap Measure 3 
Relative Fiscal 
Gap Measure 4 
Minimum 0.0006 0.0015 0.0067 0.0027 
Maximum 0.1683 0.1764 0.1782 0.1633 
Range  
(maximum–minimum) 
0.1677 0.1749 0.1716 0.1605 
Average 0.0480 0.0530 0.0630 0.0500 
Standard deviation 0.0430 0.0450 0.0430 0.0390 
 
 
Table15: Relative Fiscal Gaps for Cities 
(descriptive statistics) 
 
Relative Fiscal 
Gap Measure 1 
Relative Fiscal 
Gap Measure 2 
Relative Fiscal 
Gap Measure 3 
Relative Fiscal 
Gap Measure 4 
Minimum 0.0004 0.0002 0.0012 0.0001 
Maximum 0.0542 0.0560 0.0336 0.0362 
Range  
(maximum–minimum) 
0.0538 0.0558 0.0323 0.0360 
Average 0.0182 0.0185 0.0111 0.0118 
Standard deviation 0.0143 0.0128 0.0070 0.0076 
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Table 16: Relative Fiscal Gaps for Municipalities 
(descriptive statistics) 
 
Relative Fiscal 
Gap Measure 1 
Relative Fiscal 
Gap Measure 2 
Relative Fiscal 
Gap Measure 3 
Relative Fiscal 
Gap Measure 4 
Minimum 6.27E-07 … 3.84E-06 … 
Maximum 0.010875 … 0.012303 … 
Range  
(maximum–minimum) 
0.010874 … 0.012299 … 
Average 0.002141 … 0.002028 … 
Standard deviation 0.001568 … 0.001541 … 
… = data not available. 
 
 
Table 17 provides the summary descriptive statistics for the allocation of FEEP transfers 
assigned using the fiscal gap measure 1 (FG1), that is with per client expenditure norms for 
measuring expenditure needs (EN1). It also uses the average of past collection ratios for 
measuring fiscal capacity (FC1), also using the proportional allocation mechanism for the 
apportionment of the funds as well as the vertical distribution assumed in the subsection above 
by assigning 28.75% of the available FEEP funds to provinces, 28.75% to cities, and 42.50% to 
municipalities.  
 
 
Table 17: Per Capita Fiscal Equity and Expenditure Performance Transfers  
under Proportional Allocation and Adjusted Internal Revenue Allotment  
Vertical Distribution Rule 
(P, 2008) 
 
Provinces Cities Municipalities 
Minimum 0 0 0 
Maximum 2,031.23 4,445.48 9,068.76 
Average 126.42 576.52 315.71 
Standard deviation 326.42 1,016.61 669.30 
Coefficient of variation 2.58 1.76 2.12 
Total FEEP transfers  
(P million) 
15,376.74 15,376.74 22,730.83 
FEEP = Fiscal Equity and Expenditure Performance Fund. 
 
 
Next, alternative allocation of the FEEP transfers is performed by using the same set of 
assumptions, except for the vertical distribution of the funds among provinces, cities, and 
municipalities. The FEEP funds are apportioned proportionally to the total positive fiscal gaps for 
each group of LGUs. First, the proportions or shares are computed, total, for positive fiscal gaps 
across the three groups of LGUs. The allocation of FEEP transfers that would follow if this 
vertical distribution rule was used is different from those in Table 17. As shown in Table 18, for 
the summary statistics of this distribution, the clear winners, vis-à-vis the results in Table 17, are 
the municipalities.  
 
The horizontal distribution rule applied in both Tables 17 and 18 is an example of how 
this allocation can be done. As noted, there are other possibilities for the horizontal allocation. 
Improving on the horizontal allocation rule will be conditioned by the improvements of the 
available data so that more sophisticated methodologies can be used to capture expenditure 
needs and fiscal capacity. 
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Table 18: Per Capita Fiscal Equity and Expenditure Performance Transfers  
under Proportional Allocation and Share of Aggregate Fiscal Gap  
Vertical Distribution Rule 
(P, 2008) 
 
Provinces Cities Municipalities 
Minimum 0 0 0 
Maximum 127.17 3,213.12 16,520.08 
Average 7.92 416.70 575.12 
Standard deviation 20.44 734.79 1,219.23 
Coefficient of variation 2.58 1.76 2.12 
Total FEEP transfers 
(P million) 
9,627.18 11,114.03 41,407.54 
FEEP = Fiscal Equity and Expenditure Performance Fund. 
 
 
On the other hand, there are no strong reasons supporting either modality of vertical 
allocation of the FEEP funds among the three groups of LGUs used in Table 17 and Table 18. 
Their advantage is that they offer a rationale for the vertical distribution as opposed to some rule 
that is arbitrarily derived. However, a strong vertical allocation rule could be derived, if the 
normatively derived expenditure norms are used in the computation of expenditure needs for all 
LGUs. This would also improve the horizontal distribution of the funds within each group of 
LGUs, but this paper cannot make these adjustments.  
 
To close this section, some of the dimensions of the equalization impact of distributing 
the FEEP funds are examined using a fiscal gap approach. First, not all LGUs receive transfer 
funds under this approach. As shown in Tables 11–13, only a share of provinces, cities, and 
municipalities end up with a positive fiscal gap and are therefore entitled to receiving FEEP 
funds. Based on the total numbers for the different groups of LGUs,23 the simulations show that 
only 20%–27% of provinces receive FEEP funds, 40%–61% of cities, and 31%–33% of 
municipalities.24 
 
 
Table 19: Coefficient of Variation of the Per Capita Incomes Available  
Before and After the Fiscal Equity and Expenditure Performance Fund 
 
Provinces Cities Municipalities 
Before FEEP 0.936 0.445 3.108 
After FEEP 1 0.510 0.383 2.714 
After FEEP 2 0.471 0.356 2.733 
After FEEP 3 0.542 0.360 2.497 
FEEP = Fiscal Equity and Expenditure Performance Fund. 
Note: FEEP 1 represents FEEP transfers under the adjusted weighted index horizontal distribution formula and the 
adjusted IRA vertical distribution rule, FEEP 2 represents FEEP transfers under the proportional allocation and 
adjusted IRA vertical distribution rule, and FEEP 3 represents FEEP transfers under the proportional allocation and 
share of aggregate fiscal gap vertical distribution rule.  
 
                                               
23
 The percentages that follow are based on totals of 78 provinces, 136 cities, and 1,492 municipalities.  
24
 Not all cities are wealthy, and the computed fiscal gap is still a relative concept based on historical data. Because 
few cities are very rich, this is likely to pull a large number of other cities into having a positive fiscal gap. A lot of 
these numbers could change in the future once absolute measures of expenditure needs are derived.    
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Second, the impact of the FEEP distribution is equalizing as can be seen in Table 19 by 
the significant reductions in the coefficient of variation for per capita income available before 
and after the distribution of the FEEP within the provinces, cities, and municipalities.  
 
Third, the amounts per capita distributed with the FEP are not at all trivial if they are 
compared with the amounts per capita received from the IRA; actually, in many cases, they can 
be much higher. Tables 20 to 22 show the per capita amounts received from the IRA and from 
the FEEP for the 10 largest winners in per capita FEEP amounts for provinces, cities, and 
municipalities.  
 
 
Table 20: Per Capita Internal Revenue Allotment and Fiscal Equity  
and Expenditure Performance Fund for the 10 Largest Winners from  
the Fiscal Equity and Expenditure Performance Fund, Provinces 
(based on fiscal gap 1) 
Region Province IRA FEEP 1 FEEP 2 FEEP 3 
Region XII Maguindanao 412.634 204.548 2,031.225 127.172 
Region III Nueva Ecija 491.088 190.542 941.812 58.966 
Region III Pampanga 473.961 158.447 784.321 49.105 
Region V Camarines Sur 590.530 214.251 843.024 52.781 
Region I Pangasinan 492.485 172.967 482.037 30.180 
Region IX Sulu 633.692 210.077 1,305.255 81.720 
Region VI Iloilo 577.965 197.140 513.449 32.146 
Region IV-A Rizal 432.889 144.583 363.529 22.760 
Region VII Bohol 671.935 228.898 556.333 34.831 
Region VI Negros Occidental 593.041 187.058 279.647 17.508 
IRA = internal revenue allotment, FEEP = Fiscal Equity and Expenditure Performance Fund. 
Note: Year 2008 data. FEEP 1 represents FEEP transfers under the adjusted weighted index horizontal distribution 
formula and adjusted IRA vertical distribution rule, FEEP 2 represents FEEP transfers under the proportional 
allocation and adjusted IRA vertical distribution rule, and FEEP 3 represents FEEP transfers under the proportional 
allocation and share of aggregate fiscal gap vertical distribution rule.  
 
 
Table 21: Per Capita Internal Revenue Allotment and the Fiscal Equity  
and Expenditure Performance Fund for the 10 Largest Winners from  
the Fiscal Equity and Expenditure Performance Fund, Cities 
(based on fiscal gap 1) 
Region City IRA FEEP 1 FEEP 2 FEEP 3 
Region XII Cotabato City 1,333.994 543.052 3,216.155 2,324.581 
Region III San Jose del Monte City 1,013.657 366.653 1,893.676 1,368.716 
Region XII Marawi City 1,372.108 544.568 4,376.881 3,163.533 
Region XII General Santos City 1,251.368 396.923 1,103.752 797.773 
Region IV-A Antipolo City 1,048.766 332.166 906.155 654.953 
Region I San Carlos City 1,702.440 609.463 3,524.536 2,547.473 
Region VII Talisay City (Cebu) 1,260.918 471.279 3,083.100 2,228.411 
Region V Tabaco City 1,774.952 645.854 4,445.481 3,213.116 
Region III Malolos City 1,234.820 439.594 2,392.208 1,729.046 
Region IX Zamboanga City 1,493.793 440.437 681.666 492.697 
IRA = internal revenue allotment, FEEP = Fiscal Equity and Expenditure Performance Fund. 
Note: Year 2008 data. FEEP 1 represents FEEP transfers under the adjusted weighted index horizontal distribution 
formula and adjusted IRA vertical distribution rule, FEEP 2 represents FEEP transfers under the proportional 
allocation and adjusted IRA vertical distribution rule, and FEEP 3 represents FEEP transfers under the proportional 
allocation and share of aggregate fiscal gap vertical distribution rule.  
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Table 22: Per Capita Internal Revenue Allotment and the Fiscal Equity and Expenditure 
Performance Fund for the 10 Largest Winners from the Fiscal Equity and Expenditure 
Performance Fund, Municipalities 
(based on fiscal gap 1) 
Region Province Municipality IRA FEEP 1 FEEP 2 FEEP 3 
Region IX Tawi-Tawi Balimbing 439.561 403.718 4,894.385 8,915.842 
Region IX Basilan Maluso 745.383 351.985 3,496.870 6,370.063 
Region XII Maguindanao Datu Odin Sinsuat  654.487 328.303 1,533.682 2,793.828 
Region VII Cebu Barili 745.354 361.131 2,604.800 4,745.025 
Region IX Sulu Jolo 747.425 272.250 1,116.778 2,034.376 
Region XII Lanao Del Sur Piagapo 850.203 459.664 4,373.018 7,966.094 
Region XII Maguindanao Matanog 848.958 419.647 4,149.793 7,559.458 
Region IX Sulu Indanan 860.292 312.326 1,712.173 3,118.974 
Region XII Maguindanao Parang 731.079 338.620 1,383.433 2,520.127 
Region XII Maguindanao Talayan 870.496 441.588 5,355.485 9,755.804 
IRA = internal revenue allotment, FEEP = Fiscal Equity and Expenditure Performance Fund. 
Note: Year 2008 data. FEEP 1 represents FEEP transfers under the adjusted weighted index horizontal distribution 
formula and adjusted IRA vertical distribution rule, FEEP 2 represents FEEP transfers under the proportional 
allocation and adjusted IRA vertical distribution rule, and FEEP 3 represents FEEP transfers under the proportional 
allocation and share of aggregate fiscal gap vertical distribution rule. 
 
 V. PERFORMANCE-BASED EVALUATION OF RECIPIENT  
LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS 
 
A key element in the design of the FEEP is to ensure that the additional 10% funding will be 
used by LGUs to improve their service delivery performance. There are two different 
approaches that can aid in monitoring and improving the performance of LGUs. The first is a 
traditional approach, using ex-ante controls and conditions on how LGUs can deploy the 
additional funds. These include regulations on how the funds may be spent, what kind of inputs 
can be used, and pre-approval of local decisions by higher authorities. However, the trend in 
budgeting policy and practice worldwide has been toward de-emphasizing or abandoning this 
approach.  
 
The second option is to focus on the performance of LGUs by examining ex-post what 
they have been able to achieve inquantifiable improvements in the quality and quantity of public 
services. This new trend merges well with the emphasis at the national level on  
performance-based budgeting and medium-term budgeting frameworks. However, there are 
significant difficulties in implementing this approach. The measurement of the quality and 
quantity of many public services can be challenging. Yet significant advances have been made 
in this area, and therefore, despite the challenges, using ex-post performance-based evaluation 
would be best to ensure the more efficient use of FEEP funds.  
 
Although they are not uncommon, the experience worldwide with performance-based 
grants is not yet significant. Bergvall et al. (2006) reviewed some European experience, and 
Shah (2009) reviewed the experiences of other developed and developing countries. Some  
performance-based grants in other countries are quite recent, such as Australia’s national 
schools-specific purpose payments and the Race to the Top competitive grant program in the 
United States. Among developing countries, Brazil has implemented performance-based grants 
for education and health, while Argentina, Chile, and Indonesia have used them for a variety of 
services, including roads, water, and even social insurance.  
 
In general, there are different implementation paths that can be followed. Two important 
objectives are to preserve a high degree of autonomy of LGUs and to give them enough time to 
adjust and improve their performance. This latter will be important because many of the 
recipient LGUs are relatively poor with low administrative capacity. 
 
This paper proposes providing LGUs a period of time (for example, 3 years)25 after 
receiving the additional funds to show proof of improved performance in a number of carefully 
selected indicators. In the case of unsatisfactory performance, a probationary period of 3 more 
years with reduced funding from the FEEP of 50% would be granted. In the case of failure after 
the probationary period, the FEEP allocation would be terminated for, say, 3 additional years. 
After that, a new cycle could be started for qualifying LGUs under the FEEP horizontal 
distribution rules. Of course, these are suggestive periods and rules and will be subject to 
modification and improvements through a dialogue with stakeholders, especially of LGU 
associations. 
 
A challenge will lie in the selection of the performance indicators. The indicators at a 
minimum should meet these characteristics or properties. They need to be measured 
independently from the LGUs themselves; that is, they cannot be self-reported to avoid moral 
                                               
25
 The selection of the time period may not be a simple matter since the typical terms of local officials are 3 years, so 
it is not clear that the right incentives would be in place.  
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hazard problems. Ideally, the measurements should be provided by an independent agency, 
which is accepted with respect and credibility by all stakeholders. The indicators also need to be 
meaningful, that is, matter in a significant way for quality and quantity of public services and 
ultimately for the quality of life of the residents in each LGU.  
 
An additional challenge is that whatever indicators are selected, the different LGUs are 
likely to start at different points in terms of those indicators. This means that if the indicator 
levels are too low, many LGUs would just automatically qualify, which would produce no 
inducement to increase performance. A potential solution to this dilemma may be to focus on 
differentiated changes in those indicators as opposed to the levels of the indicators. However, 
this choice will not be problem-free, because the relative difficulty of achieving advances in the 
different indicators is not likely to be independent of the level of the indicator itself. This is an 
area that will require ample discussion and consensus with stakeholders.  
 
One first choice of performance criteria is whether they should concentrate exclusively 
on the expenditure-service side of the budget or could also include criteria from the revenue 
side of the budget. There are good arguments to include the revenue side, since many 
observers of the decentralization process in the Philippines have highlighted the low level and 
declining trend in own revenue collections by LGUs. A possible performance criterion could 
involve certain percent increases in the collection of property taxes, or perhaps all own 
revenues.  
 
However, it is clear that the bulk of the performance criteria would come from the  
expenditure-service side of the budget. An important decision will be whether to focus on the 
outputs of services or on the outcomes. In general, the indicators should be service outputs, as 
opposed to outcomes, given that the local jurisdictions tend to have much less control for 
service outcomes. For example, local jurisdictions can do more to ensure high rates of 
vaccination or enrollment rates for children. They are less able to control the overall health of 
children or their overall level of intellectual achievement since these outcomes depend on many 
other variables, including the income and level of education of parents, which are outside the 
control of LGUs. 
 
Further, the property of “meaningfulness” could be met if the performance indicators are 
to focus at least in part on the Millennium Development Goals in the areas of health, education, 
and poverty reduction. Possible candidates for performance measurement could include the 
percent change in infant mortality rate, percent change in enrollment rates, and percent change 
in access to potable water. As simple as these indicators may look, there would still be 
formidable difficulties in getting them implemented.  
 
Fortunately, solid foundation work has been already done in the Philippines in the area 
of LGU performance measurement, for example by Sosmeña, Guillermo, and Sappuay (2004) 
and Guillermo (2008). The Department of the Interior and Local Governments has developed its 
own Local Government Performance Measurement System, which also provides a good starting 
point for the selection of the proper performance indicators.26 
 
                                               
26
 See also the background report from the Government of the Philippines, Department of Finance, Municipal 
Development Fund Office (2008).  
 VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS  
 
The design of the new transfer, the FEEP, for 10% additional funding as separate from the IRA 
faces four major challenges: (i) how to concretely define the origin and computation of the 10% 
additional funding, (ii) how to apportion the additional funding among the different groups of 
LGUs (i.e., provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays), (iii) what formula to use for the 
distribution of the additional funds for qualifying LGUs in each particular group of LGUs, and  
(iv) how to ensure that the additional funds will be used by LGUs to improve their service 
delivery performance. 
 
Regarding how to define the origin and computation of the 10% additional funding, two 
basic options were explored, using the same base as for the IRA, which is internal revenue 
collection, or using the broader base of total national revenues, which expands the IRA base to 
include all the collections also realized by the Bureau of Customs. The 10% equivalent increase 
in funding is the same under both options. The only difference is how the two bases perform in 
the future, in particular from the viewpoint of their volatility. Although there is some evidence that 
the broader base exhibits a bit more volatility over time, the differences are not significant. 
Therefore, there is not a clear preference for either of the two bases for the FEEP.  
 
Perhaps the greatest challenge in designing the FEEP is how to divide the additional 
funding among the different groups of LGUs. One of the options considered was a modified IRA 
apportionment by excluding the barangays from the vertical distribution. A second option used 
the vertical distribution among provinces, cities, and municipalities being proportional to their 
respective aggregate positive fiscal gaps, where those fiscal gaps were estimated in this paper. 
The advantage of either approach is that both offer a rationale for the vertical distribution as 
opposed to a new rule that is again arbitrarily derived. Fundamentally, the only sound approach 
to the derivation of the vertical distribution rule is to institute it in accordance with the true 
expenditure needs of the different groups of LGUs. The expenditure needs derived in this paper 
are based on recent budget data, and they do not necessarily coincide with what is considered 
to be the true expenditure needs. That is, the expenditure needs derived in this paper reflect the 
actual expenditures of different LGUs. If, for example, cities receive proportionally much more 
funds than municipalities, the budgetary data and therefore the computed expenditure needs 
will reflect higher expenditure needs for cities when this actually may not be the case. A strong 
vertical allocation rule can be derived if normatively derived expenditure norms are used in the 
computation of expenditure needs for all LGUs. However, this paper could not make the 
normative decisions necessary for the true expenditure needs. 
 
The paper also addressed what formula to use for the distribution of the additional funds 
for qualifying LGUs in each particular group. Here, there seems to be clear the consensus on 
the need to improve the current formula used for the IRA distributions, based on a weighted 
index of population, land area, and equal shares. In the paper, two alternative approaches were 
developed. First the weighted index approach, now used in the IRA, was improved and 
expanded by introducing additional factors to better proxy the difference in expenditures needs. 
These factors include the young and elderly populations and the incidence of poverty. An 
additional factor was also introduced accounting for the differences in fiscal capacity across 
LGUs. The second approach consisted of the estimation of a fiscal gap, defined as the 
difference between expenditure needs and fiscal capacity, for each LGU.  
 
The paper then reviewed the different methodologies available for the estimation of 
expenditure needs and fiscal capacity, and it implemented with data for 2008 two measures for 
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the estimation of expenditures needs and also two measures for the estimation of fiscal 
capacity. The simulations of the FEEP transfers were carried out with the different 
methodologies assuming two different vertical allocation rules across groups of LGUs. The first 
is a modified IRA allocation rule (excluding barangays), and the second is in proportion to the 
aggregate positive fiscal gaps in each group of LGUs. Using the fiscal gap approach allows 
restriction of FEEP transfers only to those LGUs that have a positive fiscal gap. Under the 
expanded weighted index approach, all LGUs receive FEEP transfers. 
 
The last section of the paper addressed the issue of how to ensure that the additional 
FEEP funds will be used by LGUs to improve their service delivery performance. As opposed to 
using ex-ante conditionality for receiving the additional funds, the paper proposed using ex-post 
performance indicators. This approach preserves a higher degree of autonomy of LGUs. The 
carefully selected performance indicators need to be measured independently from the LGUs 
themselves and should be meaningful in a significant way in the quality of life of residents. The 
indicators should preferably be service outputs, as opposed to outcomes, given the local 
jurisdictions tend to have much less control for service outcomes. Because of very different 
starting points in most indicators for different LGUs, performance need to be read as 
differentiated changes in the selected indicators. Failure to deliver improved performance in the 
set period would be followed by suspension of half of the available funding. After another round 
or period of performance, the funding could be completely suspended, with continued failure to 
improve, or fully restored, with increased performance. Although the paper explored the past 
experience in the Philippines with performance indicators and several possibilities that may be 
available, the actual selection of the performance indicators will require further work.  
 
  
APPENDIX 1 
BASIC RATIONALE AND MEASUREMENT OF WEIGHTS FOR 
EXPENDITURE NEEDS FACTORS 
 
There are two ways to approach the measurement of expenditure needs factors: the number of 
clients and the cost of standard local service provision.  
 
The number of clients can be used when the cost of the public service varies directly 
with the number of users. In particular, when the per unit cost of the public service is the same 
across jurisdictions and does not change with the number of users, a direct application of this 
approach is the best option to estimate expenditure needs.  
 
If an expenditure needs factor captures the number of consumers for a particular local 
service, then the natural choice for the weight assigned to this factor is the percent of aggregate 
local expenditures accounted for this particular service. For instance, if education is 43% of the 
aggregate local budget, one may wish to assign the factor “school-aged children” a weight of 
0.43 in the expenditure needs formula.  
 
It is, however, common to observe differences in the costs of inputs across jurisdictions, 
as well as changes in production costs as the number of local public services is increased, 
especially due to economies of scale. In such cases, it is desirable to identify the factors 
determining these cost differentials. These estimations can serve for developing a weighted 
factor formula or for adjusting the per client cost of local service delivery. Unfortunately, no data 
of cost difference are readily available in the Philippines. 
 
Nevertheless, in those cases for which factors attempt to capture the costs of producing 
local services rather than number of consumers, the assignment of weights requires a different 
type of reasoning. In general, arriving at particular weight factors in an objective way is a difficult 
task. One possibility is to take actual expenditures by local government unit in a base year as a 
measure of its expenditure needs (i.e., the dependent variable), and then to run a regression on 
those factors considered as relevant in determining cost differentials across jurisdictions.  
 
To estimate an expenditure needs equation, the variables in the same scale must be 
redefined (a standard normal transformation could be a good alternative), forcing the intercept 
of the regression to zero. Once all variables are defined in an identical scale, the coefficients of 
the regression provide a measure of the relative effect that, on average, each factor has on the 
dependent variable. Of course, it is not guaranteed that the coefficients so obtained would add 
up to 1; thus, a correction should be made to achieve this condition. Another possibility is to 
estimate the equation imposing that linear restriction on the estimated coefficients. At any rate, 
the estimated coefficient then represents the weights by which the factors should enter in the 
index formula to approximate expenditure needs. 
 APPENDIX 2 
ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO MEASURING  
EXPENDITURE NEEDS 
 
The expenditure needs of a jurisdiction may be defined as the funding necessary to cover all 
expenditure responsibilities assigned to the subnational government at a standard level of 
service provision. In practice, there are several options to measure differences in expenditure 
needs across subnational governments. In the following discussion, six methodologies are 
described, which are presented in order of complexity from the simplest to the most complex.1 
 
A. Lagged Expenditure Values 
 
An uncomplicated way to define the expenditure needs of a locality is relying on historical 
expenditure patterns. Specifically, the available information on expenditure data of the last few 
years, adjusted by inflation, could be assumed to represent the expenditures needs for each 
jurisdiction. If local government units (LGUs) have discretion in deciding the amount spent 
during a period, this method offers a reasonably realistic estimation of expenditure needs, with 
important advantages like simplicity and minimum information requirements. Unfortunately, 
under discretion, and particularly if LGUs have access to financial markets, the use of historical 
data could also provide perverse incentives to the local authorities, because they will eventually 
learn that increasing expenditures in the present will result in higher equalization transfers in the 
future. 
 
On the other hand, in the absence of discretion, the actual expenditures of past periods 
could be determined by the particular financial constraints of the LGUs, which are imposed 
either by the central government or by the inability to raise revenues locally. In such rather 
common cases, the historical expenditure patterns reflect undesired differences in  
revenue-raising ability instead of expenditure needs, and thus they should not be used to 
estimate the expenditure needs. 
 
To conclude, relying directly on lagged expenditure patterns is not a recommended way 
to estimate expenditure needs under equalization transfer purposes. 
 
B. Equal per Capita Expenditure Norm 
 
The simplest way to estimate per capita expenditure needs is by taking the average of historical 
expenditures per capita at a national level. To compute this average, it is first necessary to 
determine the aggregate level of subnational expenditure needs (SEN), which can be based on 
adjusted historical data or on the budget forecast, and then to divide this amount by the national 
population. This simple procedure is advantageous when there is no detailed information about 
the differences in the per capita needs or cost of provision of local public services across 
jurisdictions or when there are reasons to believe that those differences are negligible. 
 
The per capita expenditure needs constitute a national norm in this case, and to 
compute the expenditure needs for each LGU, it is only necessary to multiply this norm by the 
local population: 
 
                                               
1
 See Gomez, Martínez-Vázquez, and Sepúlveda (2007) and Boex and Martínez-Vázquez (2007). 
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Indeed, the local population is likely the most important variable in determining the total 
expenditure needs and the cost of public service provision for an LGU, because it directly 
provides an order of magnitude for the total amount of expenditures that must be incurred. Of 
course, economies of scale, economies of agglomeration, demographic characteristics of the 
population, geographical differences of jurisdictions, and other factors can substantially modify 
the applicability of the national average for each jurisdiction. Thus, the national norm could 
eventually be adjusted by one or more indexes containing information about differences in 
relative needs or costs of provision. If the index is a good approximation to the relative needs 
and costs of LGUs, this would clearly be an improvement. In any case, it is necessary to take 
into account the higher complexity that comes with the gain in accuracy.  
 
C. Per Client (Top-Down) Financial Expenditure Norms 
 
This methodology follows a similar structure than the equal per capita expenditure norm 
methodology but improves the estimation of the expenditure needs by using more detailed 
information about the expenditure functions assigned to the LGUs, and devising a local 
government functional allocation in a top-down manner. Its procedure can be summarized as 
follows. 
 
Step 1: Determine the aggregate level of subnational expenditure needs (SEN) and 
the aggregate level of expenditures needs per function j of subnational governments 
(SENj). As mentioned previously, subnational expenditure needs can be based on adjusted 
historical data or on the budget forecast. The same is true for functional expenditure needs, 
which must refer to the expenditure responsibilities assigned by law to LGUs. Alternatively, the 
functional budget forecast can incorporate adjustments responding to changes in expenditure 
priorities, but in the overall the adjustments must balance to fit the subnational expenditure 
needs.  
 
Step 2: Compute the per client expenditure norm for each function j, dividing SENj 
by the number of clients or users that the function j has at a national level, Cj. For 
instance, if referring to the subnational expenditures in secondary education, then the number of 
secondary students in the country becomes the number of clients, and the norm is obtained by 
dividing SENj by this number.  
 
It is clear that this method requires the existence of demographic data for all 
jurisdictions, as well as a functional classification of expenditures that is not always available for 
subnational governments. In this context, some gains in feasibility can be obtained by 
simplifying the procedure, either considering only the most important subnational functions, or 
by grouping the functions that have the same type of clients. For instance, if the administrative 
costs cannot be assigned to specific functions, and there are also some rather unimportant 
functions classified as other expenditures, then it will be convenient to add them up and divide 
the result by the population, which in these particular cases represents a good proxy of the 
number of clients. 
 
Given a certain number of clients, once the funding envelope for any category has been 
determined, then the per client norm has been implicitly defined. Accordingly, the amount of 
money per capita or per client in the norm can be decided in an ad-hoc manner by line 
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ministries or even stated in the law for several years or changed every year. However, the 
problem with this approach is that either the norms may not be affordable or may be too little; 
thus, to ensure the feasibility of the norms, the best practice within this approach is to first 
subdivide from the top (according to the expenditure priorities of the central authorities) the 
available funding envelope for LGUs in all of the expenditure functions or categories, as 
recommended in the first step. 
 
Step 3: Compute the per capita equivalent need of all per client functional norms 
(determined in step 2) for all jurisdictions. This step is necessary because the formula of 
fiscal disparities is defined at a jurisdictional level and expressed in per capita units, and so all 
of the elements to be incorporated must be defined in identical terms. The computation consists 
of multiplying the per client functional norm defined at the national level (SENj/Cj) by the ratio 
between the number of clients of that function in each locality and its population (Cji/Pi). The 
reasoning involved is simple. If, for instance, in a certain jurisdiction with a population of nine 
inhabitants, the number of clients of the function j is three (so the clients correspond to one-third 
of the population), then a per client need of, for example $6 million, is perfectly equivalent to a 
per capita need of $2 million (one-third of the per client need) within the jurisdiction.  
 
Either in step 2 or 3, the per capita equivalent need of each category of expenditures 
can be adjusted upward or downward to reflect differences in the costs of provision across 
jurisdictions. Again, this must be done in such a way that the overall budget affordability of the 
norm is not affected. 
 
Step 4: Compute the per capita expenditure need of each jurisdiction j by adding 
up its per capita equivalent needs for all categories. If considering three functional 
categories of expenditures (j = 1, 2, or 3), once the SENj has been determined as in the first 
step of the procedure, the three remaining steps can be summarized in the following 
expression:  
 
i
i
i
i
i
i
i P
C
C
SEN
P
C
C
SEN
P
C
C
SEN
EN 3
3
32
2
21
1
1
++=
 
 
Due to several positive features, this methodology constitutes an attractive alternative for 
the design of an intergovernment transfer system. Because of its structure, the per client 
financial expenditure norm methodology is able to define feasible national norms that are also 
flexible enough to be adjusted in response to changes in national public policy, to consider 
differences in cost provision across jurisdictions, and also to adapt to limited available 
information. Additionally, the estimation of expenditure needs is explicitly linked with the 
functions of the subnational governments, which is the correct approach to measuring 
expenditure needs. Finally, its simplicity contributes to the transparency of the system and the 
predictability of the amount of transfers to be received by LGUs. 
 
The main drawback of the methodology is its dependence on the selected expenditure 
norms. A careful, rational determination of the national expenditure norms (or the available 
funding envelope for each category) is, in this case, crucial for the success of the 
intergovernment transfer system, because deviations from the actual expenditure needs can 
importantly affect its equalizing effects. In this regard, the historical averages of per client 
expenditures by function can provide a natural reference of magnitude, and each expenditure 
norm can be adjusted upward or downward with caution, considering both the national priorities 
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and the effects on the available funding envelope, such that the remaining functional norms are 
underestimated or overestimated.  
 
D. Weighted Indexes of Expenditure Needs 
 
This is, perhaps, the most commonly used approach for estimating expenditure needs.2 It 
consists of creating a composite index of expenditure needs, which captures and weighs the 
factors determining the cost differences in delivering a standard package of local government 
services across jurisdictions. Such factors include demographic variables reflecting, for 
example, the special needs of youth and the elderly, other factors such as the level of poverty 
and unemployment, and differences in the price level or cost of living. The list of criteria entering 
the index and the weight used need to be carefully assessed and also thoroughly discussed 
with all stakeholders to ensure that the main causes for substantial differences in the costs of 
public service delivery across jurisdictions are captured in the index.  
 
The methodology for computing the weighted index and the per capita expenditure 
needs is conceptually simple, but it requires several steps that are better explained sequentially: 
 
Step 1: Determine the aggregate level of subnational expenditures needs (SEN). 
 
Step 2: Select the variables or factors explaining the cost differences in delivering 
a standard package of local government services. 
 
Step 3: Compute the indexes representing the relative expenditure need of each 
and every jurisdiction, for each and every selected variable. 
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where     is the value of the variable k for the jurisdiction i, n the number of jurisdictions, and 
thus     is the index of relative expenditure need of jurisdiction i according to the values of the 
variable k. 
 
Step 4: Establish the weights or the relative importance of the selected factors in 
the determination of expenditure needs, ka , which are identical for all jurisdictions. This 
is as follows.  
 
1=
1=
∑m
k
ka ,  
 
where m is the number of factors. 
 
Step 5: Compute the composite index of expenditure needs for all jurisdictions i 
(IENi). 
                                               
2
 This approach is implicitly applied when a weighted-factor mechanism is used for allocating equalization grants. In 
this case, however, its use is restricted to estimating expenditure needs, while in practice the weighted-factor 
formulas are usually not transparent in separating expenditure needs from fiscal capacity. 
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Step 6: Compute the expenditure needs for all jurisdictions i. 
 
SENIENEN ii ⋅=  
 
The effectiveness of this methodology in estimating expenditure needs depends on the 
choice of the factors and their weights. Objective choices of factors and weights capturing the 
variation in expenditure needs can be made by using simple statistical techniques. The factors 
are those explaining the differences in expenditure needs, and the weights represent the 
relative contribution of each factor to the overall measure of need. In practice, however, the data 
required to objectively select the factors and estimate their proper weights are not always 
available, and these decisions, subject to political pressure, are made in an arbitrary and 
obscure manner. 
 
LGU officials and parliamentarians have incentives to fight for the inclusion of those 
factors that favor their own constituencies, or for weighting them more heavily. So, if the 
analysis is not based on objective information, the political process can easily result in a formula 
that does not estimate expenditures needs properly. A tendency also exists for policy makers to 
overdesign the measure of expenditure needs by including too many factors, adding complexity 
and reducing transparency in the allocation scheme. In reality, the inclusion of more factors 
does not necessarily represent a gain in accuracy, because they are usually correlated and thus 
no new information is effectively added. 
 
Therefore, a balance has to be struck between simplicity and transparency, and it is 
necessary to find factors that equitably reflect the true fiscal need of LGUs. Variables used as 
factors should more accurately reflect needs, come from an independent source, and be free of 
manipulation by either central or subnational governments.  
 
E. Traditional (Bottom-up) Physical Expenditure Norms 
 
Expenditure needs can also be measured in a bottom-up manner, by exhaustively costing a 
standardized basket of LGU services. In addition to the determination of standard levels of 
public services (national averages or minimum requirements), this approach requires a detailed 
quantification of the inputs, information about their cost or prices, a description of the production 
process for all local public goods and services, and explicit procedures for how to cost all 
aspects of the expenditure responsibilities of subnational governments. The expenditure needs 
for each LGU are obtained by simply adding up all the costs of delivering the targeted standards 
associated with the subnational services within the jurisdiction. 
 
Although appealing, the traditional approach is usually unrealistic due to the impossibility 
of gathering all of the information it requires. Collecting and managing all the information could 
be very demanding in terms of effort and extremely expensive. Finally, this approach may also 
be impractical because it can lead to unaffordable estimations of expenditure needs, forcing 
adjustment downwards of the computed expenditure needs.  
 
These important drawbacks explain why the international practice has consistently 
moved toward alternative approaches in expenditure needs estimation during the last  
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decades.3 In particular, the top-down approach already explained can be regarded as the most 
adequate and suitable whenever the information available at the subnational level is limited, 
while other statistically based approaches can provide ideal estimations of local expenditure 
needs when the data are detailed and abundant enough to do so. One example of the latter 
approach is the representative expenditure system, methodology that will be explained in the 
following point. 
 
F. Regression-Based Representative Expenditure System 
 
Among the methodologies presented here for measuring expenditure needs, this is the most 
sophisticated and complex. It is data-intensive, and thus not suitable to be applied in all 
countries, but it offers a very good estimation of expenditure needs. 
 
Step 1: Select, among the expenditures responsibilities of subnational 
governments, those functions or categories that are subject to equalization. 
 
Step 2: Identify the main factors, other than the prices of inputs, determining the 
cost of providing local services for each of the selected functions. This can be done 
through a regression analyses in which the explained or dependent variables are the actual 
expenditures incurred in each function. The explanatory or independent variables are those that 
explain the differences in the cost of providing public services across jurisdictions. The relevant 
factors are those that are statistically significant and have a relevant impact in the costs of 
public service provision. 
 
Step 3: Compute the per capita representative expenditures for each function and 
each locality by using the coefficients obtained in step 2. The representative expenditures 
can be interpreted as the amount of money that an LGU would have spent in some category if it 
had provided the standard level of service.  
 
Step 4: Adjust the per capita representative expenditures by considering the input 
prices.  
 
Step 5: Add the adjusted per capita representative expenditures of all categories 
to arrive at the total per capita representative expenditures. 
 
The representative revenue system is technically considered the best approach to 
estimate expenditure needs, so it can be recommended whenever its application is feasible. 
However, the procedure is data-intensive, and it is usually not possible, or too expensive, to 
collect all of the detailed information required for the proper use of this model. 
 
                                               
3
 Only a few countries, most of them developed, have the capacity to deal with highly detailed expenditure norms. 
Examples of countries currently using this bottom-up approach are Denmark, Japan, and the Netherlands. 
 APPENDIX 3 
ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO MEASURING FISCAL CAPACITY1 
 
The fiscal capacity of a subnational government may be defined as the potential revenues that 
can be obtained from the tax bases assigned to the subnational government if an average level 
of effort (by national standards) is applied to those tax bases. Thus, ideally, the measure of 
fiscal capacity should consider either the size of the tax bases available to subnational 
governments or the revenue that these tax bases yield under standard tax rates.  
 
A variety of methods are used around the world to measure local government fiscal 
capacity, four of which are presented here. 
 
A. Lagged Own Revenue Collections 
 
The lagged or historical level of revenue collections constitutes a simple way to define the fiscal 
capacity of jurisdictions. Unfortunately, using past collections does not satisfactorily address the 
problem of negative incentives, because subnational governments can discern that higher 
collections translate into lower transfers and consequently reduce their tax effort to take 
advantage of the transfer system. 
 
Another problem with this approach is the existence of a difference or gap (sometimes 
large) between actual and potential collections in any jurisdiction, as well as the fact that the 
size of these gaps also varies across jurisdictions. There are several causes for these gaps to 
arise. One cause could be differences in the tax structure or in the definition of the tax base 
across jurisdictions. For instance, they could compute the taxable income in a different way or 
have dissimilar criteria for tax exemptions. In both cases, tax collection likely differs between 
similar jurisdictions, even if their fiscal capacity is identical. Similarly, tax avoidance and tax 
evasion might affect some local governments more than others, and the ability to overcome 
these problems, including the costs that must be assumed to improve the compliance rates, 
may also vary across jurisdictions. 
 
In general, using the actual amount of revenue collections in a jurisdiction as a measure 
of fiscal capacity should be avoided if local authorities can control tax rates, the tax base, or 
administrative enforcement effort. In such a case, some local governments would be able to 
reduce the actual collections (in exchange, for example, of political benefits) and benefit in an 
undesirable way from the equalization transfer system. This kind of practices could seriously 
damage the equalizing effects of the program.  
 
Due to these complications, and the similar shortcomings presented by the lagged 
expenditure values in estimating expenditure needs, the direct application of historical data in 
estimating the fiscal disparities should, in general, be avoided. As an alternative, the same as in 
the case of expenditure needs estimation, simple manipulation of the available historical data 
can serve to reduce the problems related to perverse incentives and the differences between 
actual collections and true fiscal capacity. The following methodology is an example of this 
strategy. 
 
 
 
 
 
______________________________ 
1
 See again Gomez, Martínez-Vázquez, and Sepúlveda (2007) and Boex and Martínez-Vázquez (2007). 
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B. Average of Past Collection Ratios 
 
To reduce the problems related to the use of lagged own revenue collections in estimating fiscal 
capacity, some slight manipulations of historical collection can provide effective and 
straightforward solutions. 
 
The present methodology consists of computing the ratio between local per capita 
revenues and the per capita revenues at the national level for several years, and then obtaining 
an average of these ratios for each jurisdiction, which indicates the relative size of local per 
capita collections with respect to the national standard in a period of several years. Thus, a 
single estimator of relative fiscal capacity is obtained for each jurisdiction and considers only 
historical collection data. There are important potential advantages in using historical data in this 
indirect way. The complete procedure can be summarized in the following six steps. 
 
Step 1: Select, among all sources of revenues, those that can be used to represent 
the fiscal capacity of local governments. If fiscal capacity is understood as the revenues that 
a local government unit (LGU) raises by applying standard tax rates to their tax bases, then it is 
natural to consider the own taxes applied by the LGU within its jurisdiction as the most important 
source of revenue. However, since what matters is to measure the ability of an LGU to cover its 
expenditure needs, it is also necessary to include those received as revenue sharing from the 
central government and all intergovernment transfers exempting only equalization transfers. 
Again, to avoid undesirable manipulation, it is appropriate that no discretion is allowed by 
central or local government officials in the determination of the tax rates or the composition of 
the tax base on these sources of revenue. 
 
Step 2: Define the historical periods that can serve better as a reference for 
estimating future fiscal capacity. The more periods considered, the lower the possibility of 
undesirable manipulation of the index created for estimating future fiscal capacity. However, the 
use of very old collection data can be misleading if many changes have taken place in the 
collection patterns of LGUs during the last years. For these reasons, periods of 3, 4, or 5 years, 
depending on data availability and current relevancy of the information, could be a plausible 
choice. 
 
Step 3: Compute the per capita revenue for each jurisdiction i and for each period 
t (Rjt), as well as the per capita revenue at a national level for every year (RNt). Defining Pit 
and PNt as the population in jurisdiction i and the national population in period t, then the per 
capita revenues for each revenue source j, jurisdiction i and period t are defined as 
 
ti
t
tji P
jsourcefromiforrevenuesR ,= ,  and  
tN
t
tjN P
jsourcerevenuestotalR ,= . 
 
Furthermore, the total per capita revenues at jurisdictional and national level in each 
period are given by ∑= j tjiti RR  and ∑= j tjNtN RR , respectively. 
 
Step 4: Compute the relative collection ratios, for every jurisdiction i and period t 
(RCRit), which are obtained for every year by dividing the per capita revenues of 
jurisdiction i by the national per capita revenues: tNtiit RRRCR = . The relative collection 
ratios can be lower, equal, or higher than 1, meaning that the jurisdiction have collected less, 
the same, or more per capita revenues than the country as a whole during a certain year. 
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Step 5: Compute the index of relative collection for each jurisdiction (IRCi), as the 
average of all relative collection ratios of the jurisdiction. Defining T as the number of 
periods selected for the estimation, then TRCRIRC
t tii ∑= . The index of relative collection 
has exactly the same interpretation than the relative collection ratios, but it refers to a longer 
period of time. This last characteristic helps moderate the perverse incentives associated with 
the benefits of reducing tax collections, because now, if an LGU wants to increase the amount 
of future transfers, it must modify a multiyear average instead of a single-year result. Indeed, the 
expected benefits of reducing the local tax collections are decreased in proportion to the 
number of periods used in the computation of the average, so the perverse incentives are 
directly reduced as well. Additionally, if the local government officials are not sure whether they 
will remain in their positions during the following years, then the idea of beneficiating competing 
political parties in the future can also discourage that behavior. If present, this “democratic 
factor” could eventually increase the effectiveness of this methodology. 
 
Step 6: Estimate the per capita fiscal capacity for all jurisdictions as 
 
⋅= ii IRCFC Aggregate Revenue Forecast 
 
This estimation of fiscal capacity can be interpreted as the fiscal capacity that the LGU i 
would have in the forecasted period if the average tax collection at the local and national level 
remains unchanged and the macroeconomic expectations are fulfilled.  
 
C. Basic Proxies for the Local Ability to Tax 
 
A different approach to estimating the fiscal capacity of subnational governments is by 
considering proxies or variables that in theory should be highly correlated with their ability to 
collect revenues. A widely used variable is the per capita level of personal income, which tends 
to be a good proxy and is usually available. Another commonly used variable is the gross 
regional product (GRP), which is the subnational equivalent of gross domestic product and can 
also serve as a proxy of fiscal capacity. GRP is actually a more comprehensive measure of 
fiscal capacity than per capita income, because it includes all the income generated within a 
region, personal and corporate, irrespective of the location of residence of the worker or 
producer. 
 
To improve the estimation of fiscal capacity, it is also possible to exclude from the GRP 
certain items such as central taxes and transfers, which are not part of the potential tax base. 
The resulting modified version of the GRP is referred as total taxable resources, and it 
constitutes a good estimator of fiscal capacity. 
 
D. Representative Revenue System 
 
The basic idea underlying the representative revenue system is to calculate the amount of 
revenue that a region would collect if it is to exert average fiscal effort. This is done by collecting 
data on revenue collections and tax bases for each tax under consideration and for every 
subnational region. Based upon information on all tax bases for every region as well as the 
national average fiscal effort for each of the taxes, one can compute the amount of revenues 
that each jurisdiction would collect under average fiscal effort. This amount is then considered to 
quantify the fiscal capacity of each jurisdiction.  
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The representative revenue system is a thorough, complete method to measure the 
fiscal capacity of a region. It is based on disaggregated data and detailed knowledge of the 
statutory tax bases, taking into account variations in effective tax rates among various tax 
components and nontax revenue sources. As a result, fiscal capacity as measured by the 
system can be considered as an accurate representation of a region’s true fiscal capacity. 
However, due to the disaggregated nature of the information, the measure is data-intensive and 
is not always possible to use. 
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